Sports as finite provinces of meaning : an application of the phenomenology of Alfred Schutz by NC DOCKS at The University of North Carolina at Greensboro & Whitaker, K. Gail
INFORMATION TO USERS 
This was produced from a copy of a document sent to us for microfilming. While the 
most advanced technological means to photograph and reproduce this document 
have been used, the quality is heavily dependent upon the quality of the material 
submitted. 
The following explanation of techniques is provided to help you understand 
markings or notations which may appear on this reproduction. 
1. The sign or "target" for pages apparently lacking from the document 
photographed is "Missing Page(s)". If it was possible to obtain the missing 
page(s) or section, they are spliced into the film along with adjacent pages. 
This may have necessitated cutting through an image and duplicating 
adjacent pages to assure you of complete continuity. 
2. When an image on the film is obliterated with a round black mark it is an 
indication that the film inspector noticed either blurred copy because of 
movement during exposure, or duplicate copy. Unless we meant to delete 
copyrighted materials that should not have been filmed, you will find a 
good image of the page in the adjacent frame. 
3. When a map, drawing or chart, etc., is part of the material being photo­
graphed the photographer has followed a definite method in "sectioning" 
the material. It is customary to begin filming at the upper left hand corner 
of a large sheet and to continue from left to right in equal sections with 
small overlaps. If necessary, sectioning is continued again—beginning 
below the first row and continuing on until complete. 
4. For any illustrations that cannot be reproduced satisfactorily by 
xerography, photographic prints can be purchased at additional cost and 
tipped into your xerographic copy. Requests can be made to our 
Dissertations Customer Services Department. 
5. Some pages in any document may have indistinct print. In all cases we 
have filmed the best available copy. 
University 
Microfilms 
International 
300 N. ZEEB ROAD. ANN ARBOR, Ml 48106 
18 BEDFORD ROW, LONDON WC1R 4EJ, ENGLAND 
8021789 
WHITAKER, KAREN GAIL 
SPORTS AS FINITE PROVINCES OF MEANING: AN APPLICATION OF 
THE PHENOMENOLOGY OF ALFRED SCHUTZ 
The University of North Carolina at Greensboro 
ED.D. 1980 
University 
Microfilms 
International 300 N. Zeeb Road, Ann Arbor, MI 48106 18 Bedford Row, London WC1R 4EJ, England 
Copyright 1980 
by 
WHITAKER, KAREN GAIL 
All Rights Reserved 
SPORTS AS FINITE PROVINCES OF MEANING: 
AN APPLICATION OF THE PHENOMENOLOGY 
OF ALFRED SCHUTZ 
by 
K. Gail Whitaker 
A Dissertation Submitted to 
the Faculty of the Graduate School at 
The University of North Carolina at Greensboro 
in Partial Fulfillment 
of the Requirements for the Degree 
Doctor of Education 
Greensboro 
1980 
Approved by 
Dissertation Adviser 
API'K'i )V'AL PAGE 
This dissertation has J>een aptjrovoJ by the following 
committee of the Faculty of the Graduate School at the 
University of North Carolina at Greensboro. 
Dissertation 
Adviser >>2. ̂ Jdc. 
Committee Members 
S 3y J9J?6 
Date of Acceptance by Committee 
' 3 f  t ?f£> 
Date of FinaliDral Examination 
i i 
WHITAKER, K. GAIL. Sports as Finite Provinces of Meaning: 
An Application of the Phenomenology of Alfred Schutz. (1980) 
Directed by: Dr. Gail Hennis. Pp. 104 
Schutz's phenomenological theory of internal time 
consciousness was reviewed. According to the theory, a 
phase of the individual's flow of conscious experience can 
be constituted as a discrete object of attention. The 
meaning of such an isolated experience is defined as the 
individual's reflective attitude when attending to the 
experience. 
A finite province of meaning is, according to Schutz, 
a set of the individual's experiences which exhibit a 
characteristic cognitive style and whose meanings are 
mutually compatible with respect to that style. It was argued 
that the set of the individual's participatory experiences 
in any sport displays a unique cognitive style and thus 
constitutes a finite province of meaning. As an example, the 
cognitive style of the sport of singles tennis was discussed. 
Reflective acts within a finite province of meaning 
result in meanings which have the cognitive style of the 
province in common. Therefore, when the individual enters 
into participation in a sport, a significant aspect of the 
meanings of the sport experiences is predetermined. Further, 
the meanings of sport experiences are fundamentally different 
when the experiences are reflected upon within different 
finite provinces of meaning. 
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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
Questions of meaning commonly arise in a variety of 
contexts. Things which have meaning include words, sentences, 
objects, persons, lives, and events or experiences. Further, 
the meaning of a thing may be its definition ("'Father1 means 
'male parent1"), its cause ("His hangover means he drank too 
much last night"), its effect or consequences ("This snow 
means no school tomorrow"), or its signification ("That ring 
means she's married"). A meaning may also be a specific 
reference ("Stay out--this means you"), an intention ("I mean 
to lose weight this month"), a purpose ("The meaning of my 
life lies in achieving freedom for my people"), or a 
significance ("I can't tell you how much this means to me"). 
Experiential meaning, or meaning in the sense of the 
significance of lived experiences, is to be investigated in 
this paper. Specifically, the study will address the topic 
of the meaning of sport experiences for the participant in 
sport. 
Sport is often discussed as a meaningful human experience, 
and athletes are frequently questioned as to the meaning of 
their participation. The wide variety of answers offered by 
those athletes attests to the broad range of interpretations 
of the concept of meaning (19:94). Their interpretations 
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also indicate the need for more disciplined inquiry into 
meaning as manifested in sport experiences. The purpose of 
this study is to initiate such an inquiry. 
As will be discussed in Chapter II, the literature to 
date contains numerous references to the meaning of sport 
experiences. Only a few works, however, include comprehensive 
treatments of the concept. More commonly, existing works lack 
either an identifiable theoretical context or a thorough 
analysis of experiential meaning within that context, or both. 
The two conceptual contexts which have been applied are 
Cassirer's theory of symbolic forms and existential-
phenomenological theory. 
The theoretical basis for this paper is existential 
phenomenology. Specifically, the phenomenology of Alfred 
Schutz will form the conceptual framework for the examination 
of the meaning of lived experiences within the province of 
sport. 
There are two reasons for the selection of Schutz's 
work as a theoretical base. First, his theory is both 
extensive enough and comprehensive enough to encompass all 
aspects of the concept of meaning which are of concern in 
this investigation. Second, Schutz's analysis employs a 
unique combination of concepts extracted from other authors. 
The resultant framework shows considerable potential for 
application to, and illumination of, lived experiences 
within the context of sport. Therefore, the works of Alfred 
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Schutz have been chosen as the foundation of the study, and 
all explanations and arguments are based on that foundation. 
The Schutzian Framework 
Essential to an understanding of Alfred Schutz's 
treatment of the concept of meaning is his phenomenological 
conceptualization of time consciousness. As the foundation 
of this conceptualization, Schutz accepted the Bergsonian 
notion of duree, also referred to by Schutz as duration or 
personal time. The individual's consciousness of experiences 
occurs within duration. In their most elemental form, i.e., 
as the raw data of perception, experiences unfold as a uni­
directional stream of qualities, or here-and-nows, one after 
another within the individual's personal time (24:47). This 
flow of experiences in duration was referred to by Bergson, 
and acknowledged by Schutz, as the stream of consciousness. 
Personal time, within which the stream of consciousness, 
or flow of conscious experiences, unfolds, is an example of 
a time frame, or frame of reference for time. Another time 
frame is biological time, in which physiological events 
such as healing, aging, and the prenatal development of a 
baby occur (25:181). Still another is cosmic time, the time 
frame of everyday, public life (25:181). Cosmic time, then, 
is external to the individual, as contrasted with internal 
personal time. 
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Conscious actions which involve movements by the 
individual in the outer world take place both in external, 
cosmic time (as bodily movements in space) and in internal, 
personal time (as conscious events related to the experienced 
action). This intersection, or co-experiencing, of cosmic 
time and duration produces a unified flow of experience 
called the vivid present (21:216). Sport participation, for 
example, involves both physical activity in the outer world 
(cosmic time frame) and internal conscious events (personal 
time frame). Thus, it is experienced in the vivid present, 
a fact which will prove useful in the characterization of 
sports. 
One further Bergsonian concept contributed to Schutz's 
framework of time consciousness. It is the idea of the 
tension of consciousness. Conscious experiences occur on 
various levels or planes, depending on the individual's 
attention to, and interest in, life (26:25). These planes 
represent corresponding tensions of consciousness, the 
highest tension represented by the plane of action and the 
lowest by the plane of dream (21:212). The concept of 
tension of consciousness will be used to help characterize 
finite provinces of meaning. 
Schutz accepted the foregoing concepts of Henri Bergson, 
and added to them a set of ideas derived from Edmund Husserl 
in order to complete his framework of time consciousness. 
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Within the completed framework, the meaning of lived 
experiences will be examined. 
The central concept borrowed from Husserl is that of 
reflection. Although the stream of consciousness is uni­
directional and continuous, the individual can attend to, or 
reflect upon, experiences within the stream (24:47). By 
constituting a phase of the stream as a discrete object of 
attention, the individual can consider that phase in a new 
light, that is from the perspective of the current phase 
of the stream (the here-and-now) (21:210). 
By means of reflection, the content of consciousness 
(i.e., the experiences in the stream of consciousness) can 
be attended to independently of originally being undergone 
(21:210). As they are originally occurring, as the stream of 
consciousness is unfolding, experiences are said to be pre-
reflective, or pre-phenomenal (24:56). By the act of 
reflection, they are changed to reflective or phenomenal 
status (24:75). By Schutz's definition, this process is 
necessary in order for experiences to be meaningful (24:52). 
The four types of reflection are recollection, 
retention, anticipation, and protention. Many past 
experiences must be recalled, i.e., reconstructed as objects 
of attention, in order to be reflected upon. Reflection 
which involves such reconstruction of the experience is 
called recollection (24:48-49). 
6 
In order to reflect upon future experiences (those not 
yet within the stream of consciousness), the individual 
first attends to them "in the future perfect tense," that is, 
imagines them to have already happened (21:215). This type 
of reflection is called anticipation. Since it involves a 
conscious structuring of the experience as in recollection, 
anticipation is described as the "future-directed counterpart 
of recollection" (24:58). 
As the individual performs an intentional action, the 
immediate future within that action is the ongoing object of 
reflection. This attentive grasping of the imminent future 
in order to bring it about is the type of reflection known as 
protention (24:57). 
The variations of reflection described above are based 
on Edmund Husserl's writings. Along with the Bergsonian 
concepts previously explained, they form the essential 
structure of Schutz's theory of time consciousness, within 
which his concept of meaning is to be understood. 
According to Schutz (24), experiences in their pre-
reflective status (or as original phases of the individual's 
stream of consciousness) are without meaning. The individual 
is pre-reflectively conscious only of a continuous flow of 
undifferentiated events. By the act of reflection, however, 
the individual attentively considers an objectified phase of 
the stream of consciousness. It is by this act of reflection 
(and only by such an act) that the experience attended to 
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(reflected upon) becomes meaningful. Specifically, the 
meaning of the lived experience for the individual lies in 
t^ie attitude, or conscious stance, of the individual in 
reflecting upon the experience. 
If the meaning of a lived experience lies in the 
individual's reflective attitude toward that experience, 
then variations in the individual's reflective attitude can 
affect the meaning of an experience for the individual. 
Based on Husserl., Schutz (24:73) described attentional 
modifications, or alterations in the reflective attitude. 
As the interests, relevances, motivations, etc. which 
characterize the individual's here-and-now vary, the 
individual's corresponding point of view toward an experience 
changes. As a result, the reflective attitude, and thus the 
meaning of the experience, is subject to change as attention 
to the experience is modified. 
Although individual meanings of lived experiences are 
subject to change as described above, Schutz (24:75) also 
discussed unifying influences on such meanings. Separate 
experiences can be viewed in a polythetic manner, that is, 
with a separate act of attention and thus a separate meaning 
for each. Alternatively, several separate experiences may 
be viewed as related, and unified into a single object of 
attention. Polythetic reflective acts are thus synthesized 
into a single, monothetic reflection upon the unified object 
of attention. As a result, separate meanings are interrelated 
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by the encompassing meaning of the unified whole. The 
relationship among such experiences is called a configuration 
of meaning, or meaning context. 
The concept of finite province of meaning completed 
Schutz's conceptualization of meaningful lived experience. 
A finite province of meaning is a set of the individual's 
experiences whose meanings are mutually compatible and which 
share a particular style called cognitive style (26:23). 
Examples given of finite provinces of meaning include, among 
others, the world of everyday life, the world of dreams, the 
world of madness, and the child's play world (21:230-232). 
It will be shown that a finite province of meaning constitutes 
a high-order meaning context. 
Statement of the Problem 
In terms of the theory outlined above, answers to the 
following questions will be sought: 
1. Do sports constitute finite provinces of meaning? 
An attempt will be made to definitively characterize a finite 
province of meaning. If the attempt proves to be successful, 
then a definition of a sport will also be offered. Based on 
that definition, an argument will be presented for the 
constitution of sports as finite provinces of meaning. 
2. How, if at all, do finite provinces of meaning 
affect the meaning configurations of intra-province lived 
experiences? Schutz's framework reflects the view that 
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individual meanings form elements of larger and still larger 
configurations of meaning, among the largest of which are 
finite provinces of meaning. In this study, the relationship 
between participation in a particular finite province of 
meaning and the meanings of lived experiences within that 
province will be investigated. 
3. If sports constitute finite provinces of meaning, 
then what implications can be drawn for the effect of 
participation in a sport on the meanings of sport experiences 
for the participant? If sports constitute finite provinces 
of meaning, and if finite provinces of meaning have certain 
effects on the meanings of intra-province lived experiences, 
then, syllogistically, participation in a particular sport 
has specifiable effects on the meanings of participatory 
experiences. The nature of these effects will be suggested. 
Underlying Assumptions 
Three primary assumptions underlie this investigation. 
First, Alfred Schutz's phenomenological conceptualization of 
the meaning of lived experiences is accepted as the foundation 
for the study. Treatment of all concepts related to time 
consciousness, meaning contexts, and finite provinces of 
meaning is in accord with those concepts as put forth by 
Schutz. 
Second, Schutz's comprehensive framework is the basis of 
this study; individual elements of the framework are useful 
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only as adapted to that context. Therefore, concepts 
originally contributed by Henri Bergson, Edmund Husserl, and 
William James are accepted only as interpreted by Schutz. 
Third, the literature contains arguments for numerous 
definitions of the term "sport." For the purposes of this 
study, the description of sport given by Ellen Gerber is 
accepted as definitive (see Glossary of Terms). 
Scope of the Study 
As stated above, the investigation is restricted to the 
phenomenological framework of Alfred Schutz. In addition to 
this qualification, there are three major limitations to the 
scope of the study. First, the concept of meaning is 
addressed only as it applies to lived experiences. Other 
uses of the term, such as the meaning of words or sentences, 
are not dealt with. 
Second, only meanings for the individual who undergoes 
the experiences are under investigation. Hence, the study 
is concerned only with sport experiences of the participant 
in sport rather than those of the observer or student of 
sport. 
Third, outcomes of the investigation apply only to those 
activities which constitute sports as defined in the study. 
Therefore, it would be incorrect to extrapolate findings 
beyond the boundaries of that definition. 
11 
Glossary of Terms 
The following concepts are essential to the 
understanding of Schutz's theory of time consciousness and 
meaning. Discussed more fully in Chapter III, they will be 
used to explain additional concepts which are developed in 
later chapters. Therefore, they are presented here, with 
Gerber's definition of sport, as a condensed glossary of 
terms for the convenience of the reader. 
Anticipation• Reflection upon future experiences, i.e., 
experiences which do not yet fall within the stream of 
consciousness, by attention to them "in the future perfect 
tense," as if they had already occurred (21:215). It is 
"the future directed counterpart of recollection" (24:58). 
Attentional Modification. Alteration of the individual's 
reflective attitude toward an experience, concomitant with a 
change in the individual's point of view in the here-and-now. 
It results in alteration of the meaning of the experience 
being reflected upon (24:73). 
Configuration of Meaning, or Meaning Context. A 
relationship among separate experiences resulting when, by 
a shift in the individual's attention, polythetic reflective 
glances at distinct events are synthesized into a monothetic 
glance at now unified objects of attention (24:75). Meanings 
already created are thereby synthesized into a constitution 
of a higher order (24:75). 
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Duration or Personal Time. The individual's inner time 
frame, in which the stream of consciousness unfolds (25:181). 
The foundational component of time consciousness, it is a 
uni-directional stream in which experience flows continuously 
from one here-and-now to the next. It binds together the 
experiences of the individual (by the fact that they are all 
experiences of this individual) (24:75), and it intersects 
with external, cosmic time as the individual acts in the 
outer world (21:216). 
Finite Province of Meaning. A set of experiences all of 
which demonstrate "a specific cognitive style and are—with 
respect to this style—not only consistent in themselves but 
also compatible with one another" (21:230). It is a high-
order configuration of meaning, consisting of mutually 
compatible lower-order meaning contexts. No one finite 
province of meaning can be reduced or translated into another, 
and the transition from one to another involves a "leap" or 
"shock" (26:24). In the absence of incompatible experiences, 
the "accent of reality" is bestowed on the current finite 
province of meaning (21:231). 
Meaning Context. See Configuration of Meaning. 
Meaning of a Lived Experience. The attitude, or conscious 
stance, of the individual in reflecting upon a past part of 
the stream of consciousness (24:69-70). It is subject to 
change with modifications of the individual's attention to 
experiences (24:73). It constitutes reality for the 
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individual within the current finite province of meaning 
(21:341). 
Personal Time. See Duration. 
Protention. Reflection upon the immediate future within 
an intentional action. The individual attentively grasps the 
immediate future in order to bring it about (24:57). 
Recollection. Reflection upon a past experience, i.e., 
an elapsed phase of the stream of consciousness, by 
reconstructing it as an object of attention (24:49). The 
attitude of the individual during such reflection is the 
meaning of the experience for the individual (24:69-70). 
Reflection. Attentive consideration of a phase of the 
stream of consciousness, either already elapsed (as in 
recollection) or envisioned as already elapsed (as in 
anticipation). It is a "turning-back against the stream, a 
special kind of attitude toward that stream" (24:47). By the 
act of reflection, the content of consciousness is changed 
from pre-phenomenal to phenomenal status (24:75), and meaning 
is bestowed upon an experience. 
Retention. The after-consciousness, or still-
consciousness, of an experience just preceding in the stream 
of consciousness (24:48). It is the form of reflection which, 
occurring closest within duration to the original experience, 
involves the least amount of reconstruction of the experience. 
It is primary remembrance, which eventually fades or runs off, 
necessitating secondary remembrance, or recollection (24:48). 
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Sport. "A human activity which involves specific 
administrative organization, a historical background of rules 
or customs which define the objective and limit the pattern 
of human behavior; it involves challenge and a definite 
outcome determined by physical skill" (8:vii). 
Stream of Consciousness. The flow of heterogeneous 
qualities experienced by an individual within duration 
(24:45). It consists of those experiences which are 
immediately and continuously perceived by the individual. 
Tension of Consciousness. A function of the individual's 
attention to, and interest in, life, ranging from the plane of 
action (highest tension) to the plane of dream (lowest tension) 
(21:212). Each finite province of meaning has, among other 
characteristics, a specific tension of consciousness. 
Vivid Present. A unified flow of experience originating 
in the intersection of internal time, or duration, and 
external, or cosmic, time (21:216). All wording action, 
whereby the individual interacts intentionally and physically 
in the outer world, is experienced in the vivid present 
(21:216). 
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CHAPTER II 
REVIEW OF RELATED LITERATURE 
Several authors have addressed the topic of meaning in 
sport experiences. These authors represent a variety of 
approaches to the concept. Their observations illuminate a 
number of factors which comprise and which influence 
experiential meaning in sport. 
Each of the authors to be cited contributed to the task 
of analyzing experiential meaning in sport. Most, however, 
failed to provide a comprehensive treatment of the concept. 
Their insights are of limited value because they were offered 
without reference to any underlying theoretical framework. 
Consequently, they constitute isolated distinctions or 
individual interpretations, with no sound conceptual basis. 
Only a few authors have escaped this difficulty by providing 
a theoretical background for their comments. Even fewer of 
these have offered extensive insights on experiential meaning 
within such a theoretical framework. 
Roger Bannister was the first athlete to run the mile 
in less than four minutes. In 1964, Bannister (2) addressed 
himself to "The Meaning of Athletic Performance." He 
discussed several examples of character-building, such as 
maturity, which he felt can result from sport participation. 
He also cited examples of self-trial, e.g., struggling to do 
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one's best, which he considered to be satisfying aspects of 
sport. He used other examples to illustrate social benefits 
of sport participation, such as acquiring the companionship 
of kindred people. 
Despite these attempts at delineating meaning in sport, 
Bannister concluded that he had failed to describe it after 
all. He maintained that the meaning of sport is specific to 
each individual. Further, he found himself unable to 
describe the meaning of sport experiences even for himself, 
and suggested that no athlete can explain it. Thus, Bannister 
demonstrated the difficulty of analyzing the meaning of sport 
experiences for the sport participant. 
A physical educator at Brevard College in 1972, Patsy 
Meal (17) discussed the concept of "meaning through wholeness" 
in sport. Neal stated that, in order for sport to be 
meaningful, the individual must confront it in a personal way. 
This is possible when the athlete participates in sport with 
total involvement, acknowledging that the world of sport and 
the world outside of sport are the same. When the athlete 
participates in this manner, then both the sport experience 
and the athlete have meaning. 
Neal's discussion of meaning in sport is rambling and 
disjointed. In addition, it is without an identifiable 
theoretical basis. As such, its contribution to the 
understanding of meaning in sport is minimal. 
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Jan Felshin (6), a professor of physical education at 
East Stroudsburg State College, identified in 1969 two modes 
of experiential meaning in sport—the social mode and the 
personal mode. Focusing on the social mode of meaning, 
Felshin stated that it is linked to the structure of sport 
as a social institution, and to the social interactions, 
roles, statuses, socializing agents and models, i.e., the 
pervasive social context, of sport experiences. She pointed 
out the difficulty of ascertaining whether the meaning in 
sport determines its structure or whether the structure 
determines its meaning. 
In the book, More Than Movement (1972), Felshin 
emphasized the importance of the personal mode of meaning in 
experience. She maintained that any meaning found in 
experience must include the basic element of personal meaning. 
Further, she associated personal meaning with the idea of 
relevance. Those things which one finds to be meaningful, 
she stated, are things which are personally relevant, or 
somehow within the scope of one's own concern or attention. 
Felshin's distinction between the social and personal 
modes of experiential meaning contributed to the understanding 
of the concept of meaning in sport. Her association of 
personal meaning with personal relevance also added to the 
characterization of experiential meaning. These observations, 
however, did not constitute a thorough analysis of the 
concept, nor did they fall within an identifiable theoretical 
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context. Thus, the scope of Felshin's contributions to the 
study of experiential meaning in sport was limited. 
In 1975, Christopher Stevenson (28) was a physical 
educator at the University of New Brunswick. In an article 
entitled "The Meaning of Movement," Stevenson made some 
distinctions with regard to the study of meaning in movement 
(and specifically in athletics), but declined to suggest an 
analysis of meaning itself. Stevenson maintained that the 
meaning of athletics is involved with larger social meanings 
because athletics as a human movement phenomenon is an 
example, or category, of human endeavor in general. 
Stevenson distinguished two approaches, or orientations, 
to the study of meaning in movement. The kinesics 
orientation, involving detailed analysis of the structural 
elements of various movement forms, is of limited use in 
discovering meaning. A more promising approach, Stevenson 
claimed, is the sociology of knowledge orientation. He 
supported the view that meaning is determined, or created 
and specified, by society. The sociology of knowledge, 
while not providing specific tools for analyzing meaning, is 
concerned with the sources of meaning. Therefore, Stevenson 
advocated this approach to the discovery of meaning in 
athletics. 
Although the observations above are directly concerned 
with the pursuit of meaning in sport, Stevenson stated that 
it was not his intention to definitively analyze the meaning 
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of movement himself. His description of meanings in 
athletics as dependent upon larger, social meanings is a 
step toward analyzing the source and operation of such 
meanings. Further, his support of the sociology of knowledge 
orientation over the kinesics orientation helped to clarify 
the task of discovering meanings in sport experiences. 
However, the lack of suggestions as to either a proper 
theoretical framework or specific analytical instruments left 
his treatment far from comprehensive. 
Patricia Phillips (19), a physical educator at 
Bridgewater State College, claimed in a 1975 article that 
descriptions of sport experiences commonly given by athletes 
in response to questions of its meaning for them actually 
have little to do with the meaning of sport. Phillips 
maintained that what gives rise to the meaning o-f a thing, 
for example sport, is its form. She described form as a 
unity, or an ordering, of the experience. In sport, Phillips 
stated, the elements of form include the skills, means of 
expression, and rules of the game. When an individual can 
view each of the elements of a sport in relation to the 
whole, then the individual makes sense of the form of the 
sport, and confronts its meaning. Further, Phillips 
suggested that this is only possible if the individual not 
only masters the skills, means of expression, and rules of 
the sport, but also becomes totally involved, or immersed, 
in the experience. 
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Phillips pointed out that the form of expression in 
sport is different from the forms of expression in other 
experiences, such as music and dance. She concluded that 
the meaning of sport, then, is unique. In addition, 
Phillips observed that the elements of form in sport can 
only be understood in the context of the persons who engage 
in sport, their place, time, and culture. Therefore, she 
argued, the meaning of sport is culturally dependent. 
Phillips' emphasis on the form of sport as the key to 
its meaning, and her insistence on the uniqueness and 
culture-relatedness of that meaning, contributed to the 
characterization of experiential meaning in sport. Her 
suggestion of the importance of involvement in the experience 
as a prerequisite to meaning was also revealing of the 
concept. The theoretical basis of her arguments, however, 
was unclear. Thus, her work was limited in background as 
well as in scope. 
Shirl Hoffman (10), a physical educator at the 
University of Pittsburgh in 1976, equated the meaning of 
sport with its purpose and nature. In an article presented 
in the Journal of the Philosophy of Sport, he addressed the 
concept of athletae Dei, or spiritual athletes, and offered 
an interpretation of the meaning of sport for such athletes. 
Hoffman suggested that the meaning of sport for spiritual 
athletes is predetermined by the nature of their religious 
(identified as Christian) convictions. However, he argued, 
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many athletae Dei miss, or at least misrepresent, the 
religious meaning of their sport participation. Hoffman 
contended that athletes who describe their performance as a 
glorification of God, justify their emphasis on winning as 
a striving for God-like perfection, and explain their 
rigorous training as the development of spiritual discipline, 
are inconsistent with the real theological stakes or true 
purpose and nature of their sport. Specifically, sport for 
such athletes should be viewed as a celebration of serious 
but happy people, joyous in the security as well as the 
responsibility of Christian faith. At the same time, sport 
should be appreciated for its demonstration of the 
insufficiencies and transitory qualities of life. 
Hoffman's suggestion that convictions and purposes 
which characterize one's life in general influence the 
meaning of specific life experiences was a significant idea. 
Although his treatment of this idea was limited to spiritual 
athletes and to strictly religious convictions and purposes, 
it represented a contribution to the understanding of 
experiential meaning in general. Nevertheless, Hoffman 
offered an analysis of only one aspect, i.e., the religious 
aspect, of the meaning of sport for the athletae Dei. 
Further, his arguments were presented without reference to a 
general theory of experiential meaning. As such, they fell 
short of a thorough explanation of the meaning of sport 
experiences. 
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Eleanor Metheny, a prominent physical educator, has 
written extensively on the concept of meaning in movement. 
In the 1965 book entitled Connotations of Movement in Sport 
and Dance, Metheny discussed the topic of experiential 
meaning within a pre-established conceptual framework. She 
identified her theoretical point of departure as the 
philosophy of symbolic forms developed by Ernst Cassirer. 
A twentieth-century philosopher known for his work in 
semantics, Cassirer conducted an extensive analysis of the 
process by which an individual undergoing a direct sensory 
experience transforms the experience into symbols, or 
abstract representations. Subsequently, the use of symbols 
evokes certain responses, either intended or unintended, in 
each person who perceives them. 
Cassirer emphasized the symbolic forms of spoken and 
written language; Metheny applied the theory to movement 
forms, including those in sport. She noted that movement 
experiences constitute symbolic forms; that is, an individual 
who experiences a movement tends to transform it into symbols. 
The individual may then recognize relationships between those 
and other symbols, or between those symbols and other direct 
sensory experiences. Consistent with Cassirer's theory, 
Metheny stated that the meaning of the experience for the 
individual lies in the recognition of relationships elicited 
in the individual by the symbolized experience. 
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In the 1968 publication, Movement and Meaning, Metheny 
distinguished between two aspects, or properties, of a 
symbol--namely, its denotation and its connotation. The 
actual constitution of a symbol (e.g., words, paint and 
canvas, movement), the particular form or pattern of 
organization of the symbol (e.g., a proper name, a 
painting, a dance), and any idea which the symbol 
specifically represents (e.g., Napoleon Bonaparte, an oak 
tree, a dying swan) are elements of its denotation. The 
denotation of a symbol, and thus one aspect of its meaning, 
may be agreed upon by more than one individual. By contrast, 
the unspecified, individual relationships, feelings, and 
emotions evoked by the symbol (e.g., tyranny, permanence, 
sadness) constitute its connotation. Because of the 
individual nature of connotations, Metheny argued, they are 
unique to each person and valid for that person only. In 
this respect, then, an experience is uniquely meaningful to 
each person who undergoes, symbolizes, and interprets it. 
Roselyn Stone (29), a student and supporter of Metheny's 
work, offered in 1975 some clarification and extension of 
Metheny1s theory of experiential meaning. Stone pointed out 
that an analysis of meaning reveals three elements—namely, 
that which is meaningful, the perceiver of the meaning, and 
the meaning referent, or perceiver1s point of comparison. 
Given these elements, Stone defined meaning as recognized 
relatedness, or "a relationship, or pattern of relationships, 
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found by the perceiver between the stimulus pattern (object/ 
event situation) and some idea, feeling, or action (referent) 
either within the perceiver1s experience or which is now 
created by the perceiver" (29:10). The pattern, or 
configuration, of meanings found by a perceiver with respect 
to an activity is called the meaning-structure of the 
activity. 
The first element of meaning-structure is the object or 
event which is meaningful. Metheny, after Cassirer, had 
termed this element the symbolic form; Stone called it the 
meaning-bearer. The perceiver may be aware of the meaning-
bearer in the form of a perception or sensation, or as a 
thought or idea. The meaning-bearer may originate outside 
the perceiver, for example the sound of a surfboard on waves 
or the feel of a basketball in one's hands. Alternatively, 
the source of the meaning-bearer may be internal, for 
example a pounding heartbeat or a feeling of pain. 
In sport, Stone observed, meaning-bearers may arise 
with regard to the actual sport performance, such as the 
call of a play in a huddle or the spectator's thrill at the 
flight of a javelin. Other sport-related meaning-bearers 
concern the planning or organizing of the sport event, such 
as a change in rules or the hiring of a new coach. Further, 
Stone pointed out that some meaning-bearers are of greater 
or more immediate concern to the perceiver than others. The 
identification of such meaning-bearers, called especial 
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bearers of meaning, aids the task of delineating the pattern 
of meaning, or meaning-structure, which a sport experience 
holds for the individual perceiver. 
The second element of meaning-structure is the 
perceiver of the meaning, or the meaning-formulator. Stone 
distinguished between two groups of perceivers in sport. 
The first group consists of persons who are present at the 
sport event, including performers, substitutes, coaches, 
officials, news reporters, and other spectators. The second 
group includes persons who are peripherally involved in the 
event, such as rule makers, promoters, league officials, and 
equipment manufacturers. Stone argued that the various types 
and degrees of involvement of each of these perceivers 
determine in part the pattern of meanings which each of them 
formulates with regard to the sport event. 
The third element of meaning-structure is the meaning 
referent. This element is an idea (e.g., conflict), a 
feeling (e.g., antagonism), or an event (e.g., a turmoil) to 
which the perceiver relates a meaning-bearer. The 
relatedness which is recognized, and the perceiver's 
response to that relatedness, constitute the meaning of the 
meaning-bearer for the perceiver. 
Stone pointed out the highly individual nature of 
meaning-structures, citing the wide variety of background 
experiences, perceptual sets, cognitive and expressive 
styles, and affective bases of individuals. This variety, 
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she observed, makes the understanding of human movement 
forms as meaning-bearers difficult. She did, however, 
suggest a distinction between two categories of meanings 
which support or enhance the meaningful event itself. 
First, those meanings which give rise to personal insight 
or feelings of satisfaction or pleasure are termed meanings 
within the act. Such meanings serve to support, encourage, 
and enhance the event itself. Second, meanings which are 
extrinsic in that they justify the event as a means to other 
ends (e.g., economic gain) are called meanings for or about 
the act. In both categories of meaning, the relatednesses 
recognized by the perceiver, whether they remain covert or 
are expressed overtly, become new meaning-bearers in more 
complex and comprehensive meaning-structures. 
The theory of experiential meaning developed by Metheny 
and expanded by Stone is admittedly incomplete but 
potentially comprehensive. One notable characteristic of 
the theory is its emphasis on the function of the meaning-
bearer. Relatively little attention is given to the 
conscious processes of the perceiver of meaning. This 
characteristic constitutes a major limitation of the theory 
as developed to date. 
In 1969, sport philosopher Warren Fraleigh (7) adopted 
the theoretical framework developed by Metheny. Within this 
framework, Fraleigh supported the concept of self-meaning, 
or personal meaning, in the form of direct self-awareness 
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arising from movement experiences. He discussed three 
perspectives on such meaning acquired in physical activity. 
First, the natural science perspective focuses on the human 
body as an object which is subject to identifiable laws of 
physics and chemistry. Certain activities, e.g., gymnastics, 
body conditioning, and swimming, tend to give the performer 
this perspective on self-awareness. Second, the social and 
behavioral science perspective concentrates on the social 
structure and interactions of performers in movement 
activities. Activities such as social dance, tennis, 
volleyball, and soccer lend themselves well to this 
perspective on the self-awareness which develops during 
participation. Finally, the humanities and arts perspective 
emphasizes individual uniqueness and personal expression in 
physical performance. Activities which encourage this 
perspective on self-awareness include modern dance and 
square and folk dance. 
Fraleigh observed that meanings perceived from the 
natural science perspective and the social and behavioral 
science perspective have a source of reference (i.e., 
scientific principles) which is external to the performer. 
Meaning from these perspectives lies in insights regarding 
the human body as an object and human social nature, 
respectively. By contrast, the reference source for the 
humanities and arts perspective is internal. Thus, meaning 
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viewed from this perspective is more personal than meaning 
perceived from the other two perspectives. 
Instances of meaningful self-awareness constitute a 
kind of knowing which, at the point of direct experience, is 
nonverbal and accepted by Fraleigh as valid. This kind of 
knowing, called pure fact, is viewed as essential to the 
larger task of increasing human knowledge of the meaning of 
the human being as a moving being. The larger task, however, 
is served only by verbalizing about the experience. 
Verbalization of self-meaning derived from movement 
experiences yields concepts whose meaning can be identified 
as universal (as in applications of physics to the body 
object) or as individual (as in expressions of personal 
emotions in dance). Thus, Fraleigh viewed the understanding 
of the meaning of the human being as a moving being as the 
result of a process involving direct individual insights 
gained through movement experiences, followed by verbal 
conceptualization and generalization using those insights as 
the basis for discussion. 
Besides the theoretical school of thought fostered by 
Metheny, the other major approach to the meaning of sport 
experiences is that of the existential-phenomenological 
school. Representatives of this approach have included 
Patricia Thomson, Simon Wenkart, Seymour Kleinman, and 
Howard Slusher. 
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In her 1967 doctoral dissertation, Patricia Thomson 
(31) reviewed the mid-twentieth century phenomenological 
theory of Maurice Merleau-Ponty. Employing a method derived 
from the writings of Merleau-Ponty, she conducted an 
experiment which was designed to reveal ontological truth in 
a sport context. Thomson defined ontological truth as "that 
knowing of reality which reveals itself to man as he exists 
in time and space" (31:10). Although she did not directly 
investigate the concept of experiential meaning in sport, 
she pointed out that, in phenomenological theory, human 
consciousness is viewed as the means of discovering meaning 
about one's self and one's world. Further, she suggested 
that, in a phenomenological sense, ontological truth and 
meaning imply each other. Moreover, while noting the lack 
of such studies at the time of her own investigation, she 
indicated that the application of Merleau-Ponty's 
phenomenological concepts is a potentially fruitful avenue 
of study in the area of meaning. Thus, Thomson pointed the 
way to a productive approach to the understanding of 
experiential meaning in sport. 
Simon Wenkart, M.D., discussed "The Meaning of Sport 
for Contemporary Man" in the Journal of Existential 
Psychiatry in 1963. Wenkart took an existentialist 
perspective on the meaning of sport. He defined an 
existential act as a "human activity which calls on the 
integration of thought, will, decision and the act" (32:399). 
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Pointing out the necessity for a synthesis and balance of 
mental and physical processes in sport, he argued that 
physical activity (including sport) may be viewed as "an 
existential act of a person stepping out of . . . isolation 
into existence" (32:401). This, Wenkart suggested, reveals 
the existential meaning of sport. "When the body is in 
action, as in sports," he stated, "we can look at it as a 
human existence open towards* the world" (32:401). 
Wenkart grounded his argument in existential theory, 
but he failed to define such key terms as thought, will, 
decision, and act within the theory. Further, his discussion 
of meaning in connection with individual relation to the 
world was consistent with existential theory, but it lacked 
further analysis in that context. 
In a 1972 article, Seymour Kleinman (12), a sport 
philosopher at Ohio State University, aligned himself with 
phenomenological theory and made some brief, general 
references to meaning from this perspective. Kleinman 
maintained that, in most contemporary physical education, 
the sport itself is emphasized rather than the participant. 
The body is treated as an obstacle or as a means to the end 
of winning, rather than as a mode of being. This approach, 
he claimed, neglects the significance and meaning of human 
movement in sport. Kleinman contended that the goal of 
physical education should be the uncovering of meaning and 
significance. He suggested that this goal is impossible if 
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physical education continues to be equated with sport and 
games. Rather, physical education should, above all, 
"develop, encourage, and nurture" self-awareness, openness 
to self, and consequent self-understanding in individuals 
(12:177). As a result, Kleinman claimed, the individual will-
discover "the deeper meaning of one's being" (12:177). 
Kleinman's approach to physical education was indeed 
phenomenological, as was his association of self-knowledge 
with existential meaning. He did not, however, define "the 
deeper meaning of one's being," nor did he explain the role 
of this concept within existential-phenomenological theory. 
Hence, his treatment of the concept was sketchy at best. 
In the 1967 book entitled Man, Sport and Existence, 
Howard Slusher analyzed sport from the perspective of 
existential theory. Slusher stated that, in existential 
terms, the time frames of past, present, and future cannot 
be separated from each other. For example, meaning in the 
future, and meaning on the whole, are dependent on meaning 
in the present. Slusher termed this relationship time-
meaning, and claimed that it is well illustrated in sport. 
The time sequence involved in a finite sport experience is 
linked with continuity to previous and subsequent time 
sequences. Thus, the meanings experienced in sport events 
are intimately and necessarily related to the individual's 
total pattern of experiential meaning. 
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Slusher also viewed sport as a source of affirmation 
of individual existence. By providing a concrete here-and-
now, sport lends to the individual a locus in the world. It 
places the individual "out of 'that which is' to 'that which 
is for now'" (27:91). In such a setting, Slusher claimed, 
one faces one's own potential—one is on the edge of being. 
Sport is a good situation, then, for the discovery of 
personal meaning. 
In order for meaning to be activated, or experienced 
in the sport situation, the individual must be personally 
involved in the experience beyond the mere mechanics of 
manipulating the body. Self must be viewed as subject 
rather than as object. Further, Slusher maintained, there 
rtuist be an attitude of inquiry into self, a merger of human 
desires with the dynamics of the experience. An essential 
element of this involvement is conscious, active, goal-
related thinking. The individual must constantly be aware 
of the demands and possibilities of an ever-changing 
situation, and transform the input of information into 
patterns of action. 
Slusher allowed that both animals and humans can think 
to some extent. However, inasmuch as humans, seeking to be 
authentic, personally relate to their thoughts, they 
experience sport as meaningful. As humans are aware of the 
implications of their thoughts and actions for the meeting 
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of their own potential, they feel the meaning of the 
experience for them. 
Sport, then, provides for the existential individual 
the setting and the raw material for meaning. Meaning is 
actually sensed as the individual relates the demands of the 
situation to the greater goal of personal fulfillment. 
Slusher argued that meaning is never activated where 
the individual divorces self from others. It is one's 
ability to relate, Slusher maintained, that makes meaning 
possible. As one must relate the activity to self, one must 
also experience one's own relationship to others. In the 
process, one's own meanings become correlated with those of 
the others who share the experience. Thus, in sport there 
exists a mutual operation of individual meanings. Further, 
Slusher claimed, in team sports there may be operating a 
group meaning. This meaning goes beyond, and may differ 
greatly from, the meanings held by each participant in the 
group. Slusher suggested, then, that there exists a 
collective character of meaning. 
Slusher's discussion of sport and meaning was at times 
ambiguous, and some of his arguments were weakly supported. 
However, his observations were firmly grounded in existential 
theory, and his analysis of meaning in that context was 
extensive. Therefore, Slusher's contribution to the study 
of experiential meaning was significant. 
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As revealed in the foregoing review of literature, 
the authors who have addressed the topic of experiential 
meaning in sport represent a wide variety of approaches to 
the concept. Bannister offered general observations 
regarding inquiry into the subject, without providing 
specific insights into the concept of meaning. Neal, 
Felshin, Stevenson, Phillips, and Hoffman contributed 
partial analyses of the concept. However, their arguments 
lacked an identifiable conceptual framework. Fraleigh, 
Thomson, Wenkart, and Kleinman each identified a theoretical 
context. However, they each extracted and applied elements 
of theory without explanation of those elements within the 
theoretical context. Only Metheny, Stone, and Slusher both 
presented a theoretical framework and began to investigate 
the concept of experiential meaning in sport within the 
context of that framework. 
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CHAPTER III 
THE SCHUTZIAN THEORY OF MEANING 
Alfred Schutz was born (in 1899) and grew up in Vienna, 
Austria. He attended the University of Vienna, where his 
studies included law, economics, and the social sciences. 
He was especially influenced by the work of Henri Bergson 
and Max Weber, and later by Edmund Husserl and William James. 
After twelve years of preparation, during which he was also 
occupied in both banking and law, he published his first book, 
Per sinnhafte Aufbau der sozialen Welt (The Phenomenology of 
the Social World), in 1932. This book was dedicated to 
Husserl, who was most complimentary of Schutz and his work. 
In 1938, before the Nazi occupation of Austria, Schutz 
went to Paris. After a year, he and his wife emigrated to 
the United States, arriving there in July, 1939. Soon 
thereafter, he accepted an appointment as lecturer on the 
Graduate Faculty of Political and Social Science at the New 
School for Social Research, in New York. In addition, he 
re-established his career in law and business. He also took 
part in the establishment of the International 
Phenomenological Society, and served on the editorial board 
of that society's journal, Philosophy and Phenomenological 
Research. In 1952 he became a professor at the New School 
for Social Research. He died in the spring of 1959. 
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In his first major work, Per sinnhafte Aufbau der 
sozialen Welt (The Phenomenology of the Social World), 
Schutz addressed himself directly to the concept of meaning. 
His delineation of the concept was grounded in his 
phenomenological theory of internal time consciousness. The 
theory will first be reviewed, then the concept of meaning 
will be defined and discussed in that context. 
Schutz's Theory of Internal Time Consciousness 
Schutz's theory of internal time consciousness was 
based heavily on the work of Henri Bergson and Edmund 
Husserl. "Only in the work of these two thinkers," he 
stated, "... has a sufficiently deep foundation been laid 
on the basis of which one could aspire to solve the problem 
of meaning" (24:xxxii). Specifically, Schutz credited 
Bergson's Essai sur les donnees immediates de la conscience 
(Time and Free Will) and Husserl's Vorlesungen uber die 
Phanomenologie des inneren Zeitbewusstseins (The Phenomenology 
of Internal Time-Consciousness) as the primary sources of his 
theory (24:43) . 
In developing his theory of internal time consciousness, 
Schutz employed three concepts derived from the work of 
Bergson. Those concepts are the stream of consciousness, 
duree, and tensions of consciousness. 
In its most elemental form, Schutz (24) explained, 
consciousness of the world as experienced by the individual 
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is "a continuous coming-to-be and passing-away of 
heterogeneous qualities" (24:45). The individual experiences 
a flow of sensory events which are the raw data of perception. 
These events are experienced continuously and sequentially, 
in a uni-directional stream. The heterogeneous qualities, or 
perceptual events, are termed the stream of consciousness. 
The coming-to-be and passing-away, i.e., the uni-directional 
flow itself, is called duree. (Schutz refers to this as 
duration, personal time, or inner time, terms which will be 
used interchangeably in this paper as well.) Thus, the 
stream of consciousness unfolds, or takes place, in the 
internal frame of reference (or time frame) of duree. 
Puree, or personal time, is one of various frames of 
reference for time which the individual experiences. 
Another time frame, for example, would be biological time, 
or the time of physiological events such as healing, aging, 
and the prenatal development of a baby (25:181). Still 
another is cosmic time, the time of nature and everyday, 
public life. Cosmic time is spatialized, homogeneous, and 
quantified. It is commonly visualized (via time lines, 
clocks, etc.) and standardized into equal parts such as 
minutes, hours, or days. By contrast, personal time is 
marked only with the passing of heterogeneous perceptual 
events, the "transition from a now-thus to a new now-thus" 
(24:45). 
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Many human activities involve operations in more than 
one time frame simultaneously. Such activities take place 
in intersections of time frames (25:181). For example, the 
birth of a baby occurs in an intersection of biological time 
and cosmic time. Another example is conscious action 
involving physical movement; this takes place in the 
intersection of cosmic time (the time frame of the movement) 
and personal time (the time frame of the conscious 
processes.) As Schutz explained, 
We experience our bodily movements simultaneously 
on two different planes: inasmuch as they are 
movements in the outer world we look at them as 
events happening in space and spatial time, 
measurable in terms of the path run through; 
inasmuch as they are experienced together from 
within as happening changes, as manifestations 
of our spontaneity pertaining to our stream of 
consciousness, they partake of our inner time or 
duree (21:215). 
The result of the particular intersection explained 
above by Schutz (that of cosmic time with inner, personal 
time) is a unification of movement and consciousness into a 
flow of experience which Schutz called the vivid present 
(21:216). Any human activity which involves both physical 
movement and internal conscious events takes place in the 
vivid present. Sport, involving skilled movement directed 
by conscious thought, is a clear example of such activity. 
This characteristic of sport will prove useful in supporting 
the constitution of sports as finite provinces of meaning, 
in Chapter V. 
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One further Bergsonian concept contributed to Schutz's 
(21) theory of time consciousness. It is the idea of 
tensions of consciousness. Activities in the conscious life 
of the individual occur on various planes, or levels, The 
factor which distinguishes each plane of conscious activity 
is its degree of tension, or intensity. This degree of 
tension of the individual's consciousness at a given time is 
determined by the individual's attention to, and interest in, 
life and its demands at that time. 
The individual's conscious life displays a range of 
planes of activity, each plane corresponding to the degree 
of intensity which characterizes it. A low plane of 
conscious activity, for example, is marked by a low degree 
of intensity or tension. The plane of consciousness 
displaying the lowest tension is the plane of dreams, in 
which the individual gives the least attention to the demands 
of life. By contrast, the plane of highest tension is the 
plane of action. Action is self-initiated, planned activity 
such as mental problem solving (thinking) or physical 
movement which is designed to accomplish a preconceived 
purpose (working). Since the plane of action is 
characterized by the highest degree of attention to life, 
it is called the plane of wide-awakeness. 
The concept of tensions of consciousness will be drawn 
upon to delineate finite provinces of meaning. It will be 
illustrated that each finite province of meaning has, among 
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other characteristics, a specific tension of consciousness. 
Thus, this and the other Bergsonian concepts explained above 
each contributed to Schutz's treatment of the concept of 
meaning. 
In addition to the concepts derived from Bergson's work, 
Schutz borrowed several ideas developed by Edmund Husserl, 
and incorporated them into his own theory of internal time 
consciousness. The central concept which is based on 
Husserl"s work is that of reflection. 
Schutz (24) described the stream of consciousness in 
duration as a flow of experiences with no clear contours, 
boundaries, or differentiations. 
Indeed, when I immerse myself in my stream of 
consciousness, in my duration, I do not find any 
clearly differentiated experiences at all. At 
one moment an experience waxes, then it wanes. 
Meanwhile something new grows out of what was 
something old and then gives place to something 
still newer. I cannot distinguish between the 
Now and the Earlier, between the later Now and 
the Now that has just been, except that I know 
that what has just been is different from what 
now is (24:47). 
Thus, there is no awareness or recognition of discrete, 
identifiable events while the individual's consciousness is 
unfolding in duration. In fact, Schutz (24) stated, the 
individual is not even aware of the stream of consciousness 
itself while still immersed in it. Awareness of the stream, 
or of discrete experiences within the stream, necessitates 
a conscious "turning-back against the stream," the taking of 
a particular attitude or conscious stance toward the stream 
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(24:47). This attention to discrete experiences is called 
reflection. 
Reflection involves a conscious shift, a modification 
of the individual's awareness of experience. Within 
duration, experiences are in the form of primal impressions, 
the state in which they originally unfold. In reflection, 
the individual lifts experience out of duration, constituting 
it as discrete events which are remembrances of primal 
impressions rather than the primal impressions themselves. 
Thus, in order to reflect upon an experience which originally 
took place within duration, the individual lifts the 
experience out of duration, making it a discrete object of 
attention, and attends to it as a remembrance. 
By means of reflection, the individual can consider an 
experience beyond its actuality, that is, independent of 
undergoing it. As it originally occurs, i.e., as the stream 
of consciousness is unfolding, the experience is pre-
reflective, or pre-phenomenal. By the act of reflection, it 
is transformed to reflective or phenomenal status. 
Pre-reflective experiences exist as primal impressions, 
which are simply phases of the stream of consciousness. As 
an elapsed phase of the stream falls farther and farther 
from the presently unfolding phase of the stream, its 
constituent experiences fade farther into the past. They 
become less clear or fresh in the memory. This fading 
phenomenon is called running off, and it ultimately results 
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in a total loss of memory, thus an unavailability of the 
experiences for reflection. 
Schutz discussed four variations or types of reflection 
identified by Husserl. They are recollection, retention, 
anticipation, and protention. 
Often a past experience falls within an elapsed phase 
of duration but is still available for reflection. Such an 
experience must be recalled, i.e., reconstructed as an 
object of attention, in order to be reflected upon. (In 
general, the more running off has occurred, the more 
reconstruction of the experience is necessary.) Reflection 
which involves such reconstruction of the experience is 
called secondary remembrance, or recollection. 
An experience which took place in the immediate past 
occupies a phase of duration which is very close to the 
presently unfolding phase. Very little running off has 
occurred, and to an extent the individual is still conscious 
of the experience. Therefore, little or no reconstruction 
of the primal impression is necessary in order to reflect 
upon it. Reflection of this type, involving an after-
consciousness or still-consciousness of the experience, is 
called primary remembrance, or retention. 
Future experiences do not yet fall within the stream of 
consciousness. Therefore, they cannot be lifted out of the 
stream. The individual can and does, however, reflect upon 
future experiences. This is accomplished by imagining the 
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experience as something which "will have been," thus 
attending to it "in the future perfect tense" (21:215). 
This conscious process allows the individual to constitute 
the future experience as an object of reflection, even 
though the experience has not yet occurred and may not 
occur as imagined. Such reflection on future experiences 
is called foreseeing expectation, or anticipation. Since 
both recollection and anticipation involve a structuring of 
experience (as it is remembered or foreseen, respectively), 
Schutz described anticipation as "the future-directed 
counterpart of recollection" (24:58). 
As the individual performs an intentional, planned 
action, experiences in the immediate future of the action 
are reflected upon, or attended to, in order to bring them 
about. This conscious grasping of the immediately foreseen 
future is the type of reflection called protention. As in 
anticipation, protention involves experiences which do not 
yet fall within the stream of consciousness. As in 
retention, however, it is reflection upon experiences which 
are very close to the presently unfolding stream. Its 
experiences link the present stream with the future stream 
as those of retention link it with the elapsed stream. Hence, 
protention is described as the future-directed counterpart 
of retention (21:172). 
One further concept derived from Husserl's work was 
employed by Schutz (24) in his delineation of the concept of 
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meaning. It is attentional modification, or alteration of 
the reflective attitude. The act of reflection itself is a 
phase of experience. It occurs in the now, or the current 
phase of duration. This fact actually characterizes the 
act itself, lending to the individual's attention the 
perspective, or point of view, of the present. Thus, each 
act of reflection carries an attitude, a subjective 
conscious stance which is determined by the perspective of 
the present now in which the act occurs. 
Each different time the individual reflects upon a 
given experience, the act of reflection occurs at a unique 
now, i.e., in a distinct current phase of duration. Since 
each phase of duration has its own point of view, each 
separate act of attention to the experience is characterized 
by a different, or modified, reflective attitude. Thus, each 
time an experience is reflected upon, the individual's 
attention to the experience is modified by the perspective 
of the present. 
The concepts described above are based on the work of 
Edmund Husserl. Along with the Bergsonian concepts 
previously explained, they form the basic structure of 
Schutz's theory of internal time consciousness. It is 
within this framework that Schutz's treatment of the concept 
of meaning is to be understood. 
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The Meaning of Lived Experiences 
Schutz (24) delineated the meaning of lived experiences 
in terms of the concepts of duration, the stream of 
consciousness, reflection, and attentional modification. 
According to Schutz, experiences in their pre-reflective 
status, in the form of primal impressions within the stream 
of consciousness in duration, are without meaning. In 
duration, the individual is conscious only of a continuous 
flow of undifferentiated perceptual events. By the act of 
reflection, however, the individual attends to a bounded, 
objectified phase of the stream of consciousness. It is by 
this act of reflection, and only by such an act, that the 
experience becomes meaningful. "Meaning does not lie in the 
experience. Rather, those experiences are meaningful which 
are grasped reflectively" (24:69). Specifically, Schutz 
stated, the meaning of the lived experience for the 
individual lies in the attitude, the subjective conscious 
stance, of the individual in reflecting upon experience. 
"The meaning is the way in which the Ego regards its 
experience. The meaning lies in the attitude of the Ego 
toward that part of its stream of consciousness which has 
already flowed by . . ." (24:69). 
By Schutz's definition of meaning, not all lived 
experiences are necessarily meaningful. "It is . . . 
incorrect to say that my lived experiences are meaningful 
merely in virtue of their being experienced or lived through" 
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(24:70). Rather, Schutz stated, only those experiences 
which are made the objects of reflective attention become 
meaningful to the individual. The primal impressions of 
other experiences (e.g., eye blinks, facial expressions, 
passing moods) may be consciously imperceptible, or may be 
lost to the memory due to rapid running off, or may simply 
not be relevant enough to the individual to merit reflective 
attention. Such experiences have occurred in the 
individual's duration; therefore, they are part of the 
individual's total set of lived experiences. They remain, 
however, pre-reflective and consequently non-meaningful. 
The meaning of an experience for the individual lies in 
the individual's reflective attitude, or conscious stance 
toward the experience. This reflective attitude, it was 
shown, is subject to attentional modification as the 
individual's point of view changes from one present moment 
to another. For example, the factor of temporal distance, 
or remoteness of the experience from the presently unfolding 
phase of duration, modifies the individual's attentive 
attitude toward the experience. Another influential factor 
is the individual's tension of consciousness, determined by 
the degree of attention to life at the moment of reflection. 
Such factors result in variations of the reflective attitude 
of the individual from one reflective act to another, with 
regard to a given lived experience. 
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Since the meaning of a reflected-upon experience for 
the individual lies in the individual's reflective attitude, 
and the reflective attitude is subject to attentional 
modification, then the meaning itself is modified by the 
circumstances of the moment of reflection. As Schutz stated, 
. . . the meaning of a lived experience undergoes 
modifications depending on the particular kind of 
attention the Ego gives to that lived experience. 
This . . . implies that the meaning of a lived 
experience is different depending on the moment 
from which the Ego is observing it (24:73-74). 
The reflective attitude, and thus the meaning of the 
experience for the individual, is subject to change as 
attention to the experience is modified. 
The attentional modification of the meaning of an 
experience from one reflective act to another illustrates 
the changeability of meaning. However, Schutz (24) also 
discussed a unifying influence on meaning. It involves the 
phenomenon of configurations of meaning. 
Upon reflection, separate lived experiences may be 
attended to polythetically, that is, with a separate 
reflective act and thus a separate meaning for each. For 
example, a student may reflect upon each of the teacher's 
statements separately. The student's reflective attitude 
toward each statement is the meaning of that statement for 
the student. At times, however, the individual views a 
number of separate experiences (e.g., teacher's statements) 
as related in some way. In such cases, the experiences are 
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gathered and synthesized into a single, unified object of 
attention (e.g., a lecture). Then the polythetic reflective 
acts become synthesized into an encompassing, monothetic 
reflection upon the unified object of attention. In addition 
to their separate meanings, the experiences (e.g., statements) 
gain a combined meaning (e.g., the meaning of the lecture) 
which corresponds to the reflective attitude of the individual 
in reflecting upon all of them at once. At this point, the 
experiences belong to a configuration of meaning, or meaning-
context. "We say that our lived experiences , . . • , 
En stand in a meaning-context if and only if, once they have 
been lived through in separate steps, they are then 
constituted into a synthesis of a higher order, becoming 
thereby unified objects of monothetic attention" (24:75). 
Separate experiences stand in a configuration of meaning, 
or meaning context, when they are viewed as a combined whole 
with an encompassing meaning. The more encompassing a 
meaning configuration is of separate meanings, the higher 
is its complexity, and thus the higher is its order. For 
the student, the meaning of the teacher's lecture is of a 
higher order than the meaning of each statement in the 
lecture. 
Just as separate meanings are synthesized into 
configurations of meaning, separate configurations of 
meaning can be synthesized into still higher-order 
configurations of meaning. For the student, the meaning 
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configurations of several lectures may be synthesized into 
the higher-order meaning configuration of an entire course. 
Higher-order configurations, it will be shown, include 
finite provinces of meaning. 
A finite province of meaning is a set of experiences 
whose separate meanings are consistent with the combined 
meaning of the configuration, and are mutually compatible 
with respect to that meaning. "A finite province of meaning 
thus consists of meaning-compatible experiences" (26:23). 
Schutz (21) gave several examples of finite provinces 
of meaning. They include, among others, the province of 
everyday work, the province of dreams, the world of madness, 
and the child's play world. In Chapter IV, the 
characteristics of finite provinces of meaning will be 
examined more closely. 
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CHAPTER IV 
FINITE PROVINCES OF MEANING 
Alfred Schutz (21) credited the work of William James 
as the source of his conception of finite provinces of 
meaning. In Principles of Psychology (1890) , James 
discussed the human sense of reality in terms of theories 
of belief and disbelief. Schutz expanded this psychological 
treatment of the topic of reality into the philosophical 
conceptualization of finite provinces of meaning. 
Meaning and Reality 
Philosophically, Schutz (21) maintained, reality for 
the individual is determined by the meaning of experiences 
for the individual (rather than, for example, by the 
ontological structure of objects). An experience to which 
the individual attends is accepted as real by the individual 
as long as the meaning of that experience is not 
contradicted by the meanings of other experiences to which 
the individual attends. Sets of experiences whose meanings 
are compatible in this way are called finite provinces of 
meaning. Examples of finite provinces of meaning include 
the world of everyday life, the world of dreams, the world of 
the stageplay, the child's play world, the world of art, the 
world of jokes, the world of religious experience, the world 
of scientific contemplation, and the world of insanity. 
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In the absence of inconsistent or incompatible 
experiences, the accent of reality is bestowed by the 
individual upon each finite province of meaning as a whole. 
While the individual is dreaming, for example, the world of 
the dream is accepted as real. When the dreamer awakens, 
however, the reality of the dream world is exchanged for the 
reality of the world of everyday life. Thus, reality for 
the individual is determined by the finite province of 
meaning in which experiences are being lived. 
Meaning and Cognitive Style 
The key to the meaning-compatibility of the experiences 
in a finite province of meaning is their cognitive style. 
Schutz (21) stated, 
. . . we call a certain set of our experiences a 
finite province of meaning if all of them show a 
specific cognitive style and are—with respect to 
this style—not only consistent in themselves but 
also compatible with one another (21:230). 
The meaning-compatibility (and thus the reality) of 
experiences depends upon the consistency of their style of 
existence, or cognitive style (26:24). All of the 
individual's experiences in each finite province of meaning 
reflect a particular, shared cognitive style. 
With respect to the cognitive style which they each 
display, the constituent experiences of a finite province of 
meaning are mutually compatible. Although a particular 
experience may contradict the others and thus be logically 
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invalidated within the finite province of meaning, unless it 
violates the cognitive style it need not cast the individual 
out of the finite province of meaning. For example, the 
individual may be dreaming about driving a car which suddenly 
takes flight, and realize that this experience is inconsistent 
with the nature of a car. Despite this inconsistency, the 
experience need not disrupt the dream, which may continue. 
The sudden intrusion of the sound of an alarm clock, however, 
drastically alters the dream's characteristic cognitive style, 
and the individual is cast out of the dream world into the 
world of everyday life. 
Schutz (21) established that the cognitive style of 
each finite province of meaning is unique. Experiences which 
are consistent and compatible in cognitive style within their 
own finite province of meaning are inconsistent and 
incompatible from the perspective of the cognitive style of 
any other finite province of meaning. Thus, no finite 
province of meaning can be reduced or translated by means of 
a formula into any other finite province of meaning. Further, 
the transition from one finite province of meaning to another 
is accomplished only by a cognitive leap, experienced as a 
shock which reflects the corresponding change in cognitive 
style. Such shock experiences are common because transitions 
from one finite province of meaning to another occur 
frequently. 
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Some instances are: the inner transformation 
we endure if the curtain in the theatre rises 
as a transition to the world of the stage 
play; the radical change in.our attitude if, 
before a painting, we permit our visual field 
to be limited by what is within the frame as 
a passage into the pictorial world; or falling 
asleep as a leap into the world of dreams 
(21:344). 
As a set of meaning-compatible experiences, a finite 
province of meaning is an example of a configuration 
of meaning, or meaning context. It consists of a set of 
experiences which can be reflected upon individually but 
may also be attended to collectively, as a synthesized 
combination of experiences. Further, it cannot be reduced 
or translated into any other finite province of meaning, 
nor can any other finite province of meaning be reduced or 
translated into it. Therefore, a finite province of 
meaning usually constitutes a meaning context r ^ a higher 
order. 
Characteristics of Cognitive Style 
Schutz (21) listed six features of cognitive style which 
can be identified in a finite province of meaning. They are 
as follows: 
1. A specific tension of consciousness 
2. A specific epoche 
3. A prevalent form of spontaneity 
4. A specific form of experiencing one's self 
5. A specific form of sociality 
6. A specific time perspective 
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In addition to the six features of cognitive style 
specifically isolated, Schutz's descriptions of various 
finite provinces of meaning include clear references to the 
following two additional characteristics of cognitive style: 
7. A specific space perspective 
8. A specific pattern of causality 
Schutz acknowledged that there may be other features as well. 
Further, other writers have cautioned that, since the list 
of features may be incomplete, it would be incorrect to treat 
Schutz's description of cognitive style as definitive (9:6). 
The description is, however, comprehensive enough to make 
understandable Schutz's definition of finite provinces of 
meaning. Hence, that definition can be used to accurately 
distinguish between sets of experiences which do constitute 
finite provinces of meaning and those which do not. 
The world of everyday life is considered the paramount 
reality because of its prominent cognitive style. Schutz 
described the characteristics of cognitive style in terms of 
their manifestations in the world of everyday life. That 
finite province of meaning will be used as a point of 
comparison for the description of those characteristics in 
this chapter as well. 
Tension of consciousness 
Schutz's conceptualization of the tensions of 
consciousness was explained in Chapter III. The greater the 
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individual's attention to the demands of life, the higher 
is the individual's tension of consciousness. The world 
of everyday life is marked by the highest tension of 
consciousness, which is called wide-awakeness. Other finite 
provinces of meaning feature lower tensions of consciousness, 
corresponding to less attention to life and its demands. The 
finite province of meaning with the lowest tension of 
consciousness described by Schutz is the world of dreams. 
The tension of consciousness is the foundational 
element of the cognitive style of a finite province of 
meaning (26:25). It can direct the individual towards or 
away from the present demands of life, thus largely 
determining the individual's attention to a particular 
finite province of meaning. For example, as the individual's 
tension of consciousness diminishes, interest in the demands 
of the life situation wanes, and the individual may drift 
from the world of everyday life into the world of daydreams. 
The transition from one finite province of meaning to 
another involves a corresponding change from one tension of 
consciousness to another. This is accomplished in the form 
of a conscious leap (in the Kierkegaardian sense), as 
described in the previous section. The individual, Schutz 
(26) observed, experiences this abrupt change as a shock. 
The shock experience is attributed specifically to the change 
in the individual's tension of consciousness. 
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Epoche 
Closely related to the tension of consciousness is 
the epoche of a finite province of meaning. Schutz (21) 
explained this concept in terms of the natural attitude, the 
prevailing attitude of the individual toward the world of 
everyday life. The natural attitude is characterized by a 
high tension of consciousness and an eminently practical 
interest in meeting the requirements of life. Given this 
objective, the individual in the natural attitude accepts 
the world and everything in it, experiencing no doubt as to 
its reality. Schutz stated, 
. . . it is characteristic of the natural 
attitude that it takes the world and its 
objects for granted until counterproof imposes 
itself. ... We are not interested in finding 
out whether this world really does exist or 
whether it is merely a coherent system of 
consistent appearances. We have no reason to 
cast any doubt upon our warranted experiences 
which, so we believe, give us things as they 
really are (21:228). 
Schutz (21) referred to the commonly employed 
phenomenological method of epoche, which is a bracketing or 
suspension of belief in the reality of the world as we 
experience it in the natural attitude. Schutz noted that 
the epoche of the world of everyday life includes no 
suspension of belief, but rather a full acceptance, or 
suspension of doubt, in the reality of existence as 
experienced in the natural attitude. Other finite provinces 
of meaning, however, are characterized by less acceptance of 
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the world as experienced in the natural attitude. Each of 
these finite provinces of meaning features an epoche which 
is the suspension of belief in certain realities of the 
world of daily life. Examples of such realities include 
those of physical existence and the inevitability of death, 
the individual's system of relevances, the individual's 
control over the fulfilling of anticipations, and the 
prescription for success and lines of responsibility. 
The individual's experiences in the everyday world are 
marked by what Schutz called the fundamental anxiety. This 
is the individual's underlying knowledge of the finitude of 
physical existence, the inevitability of death. It is 
accomplished by the awareness of other limitations—the need 
for nourishment and rest, for example, and the knowledge that 
certain feats are humanly impossible. In other finite 
provinces of meaning, however, these realities of the 
everyday world may be suspended. The world of the stageplay, 
for instance, may feature persons of superhuman strength, 
immortal beings, or even ghosts. 
Another reality which varies from one finite province 
of meaning to another is the individual's system of 
relevances. The individual's interest is selective, 
organizing the demands and concerns of life into those of 
relatively major or minor relevance. As a result, certain 
concerns command a great deal of attention while others are 
of minor interest or are totally irrelevant to the individual. 
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This organization, or system, may vary from one finite 
province of meaning to another. The companionship of 
others, for example, may be highly relevant to the individual 
in the everyday world. In the solitary world of scientific 
contemplation, however, companionship is an irrelevant 
concern. Thus, the system of relevances is a reality which 
distinctively characterizes the epoche of each finite 
province of meaning. 
Another feature of the epoche of a finite province of 
meaning is the extent to which the individual can control 
the fulfilling of anticipations. As described in Chapter III, 
reflection is of four types--recollection, retention, 
protention, and anticipation. Recollection and retention are 
types of reflection upon distant and recent past experiences, 
respectively. Both recollection and retention, then, 
determine the meaning of experiences which have already been 
manifested as primal impressions in the stream of 
consciousness. Protention is reflection upon experiences 
as they are being brought about by the individual's 
purposive performance. The actual unfolding of such 
experiences, although as yet uncertain, is controlled to a 
great extent by the acting individual. Anticipation, 
however, is reflection upon future experiences, which may 
not turn out to be as the individual expects them to be. 
Schutz stated, "anticipations are empty and may or may not 
be fulfilled by the action once performed" (21:215). 
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In some finite provinces of meaning, the individual has 
little or no control over the fulfilling of anticipations. 
In the world of dreams, for example, the dreamer is carried 
along by the flow of events, unable to control the future of 
the dream. By contrast, in the world of everyday life the 
individual, through planned, intentional performances, can 
shape the future, bringing it about in accordance with the 
way in which it is anticipated. That future, though, is 
rarely fulfilled exactly as anticipated in this finite 
province of meaning. In the world of daydreams, however, 
the individual exercises complete control over the fulfilling 
of anticipations. Experiences in this finite province of 
meaning unfold precisely as designed and anticipated by the 
individual. 
The prescription for success is a distinct reality in 
each finite province of meaning. Such factors as family 
background, wealth, formal education, personal appearance, 
physical strength, personal effort, and luck each determine 
to different extents the meeting of the individual's goals. 
In the everyday world, for example, education and personal 
effort may be considered to be the road to success. In the 
world of religious experience, faith and the grace of God may 
be paramount factors in achieving the goal of salvation. 
Related to the prescription for success is the nature 
of the individual's responsibilities in each finite province 
of meaning. In order to achieve success in the everyday 
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world, for example, the individual is responsible to 
superiors in the bureaucracy of the work force. In the 
world of religious experience, however, the individual is 
primarily responsible to the will of God. Thus, the 
epoche of each finite province of meaning includes particular 
lines of responsibility for the individual as well as a 
specific prescription for success. 
Schutz pointed out that the epoche which characterizes 
the cognitive style of a finite province of meaning is 
closely related to its tension of consciousness. 
Specifically, in finite provinces of meaning with high 
tensions of consciousness (e.g., the world of daily life), 
the individual is highly attentive to the demands of life 
and thus is highly accepting of the realities of everyday 
life. Such finite provinces of meaning are characterized 
by a minimal epoche. By contrast, in finite provinces of 
meaning with relatively low tensions of consciousness (e.g., 
the world of daydreams), the individual has turned away 
from the demands of life. In such finite provinces of 
meaning, there is consequently a greater epoche, a 
suspension of belief in more factors of everyday reality. 
Thus, as a general principle, the lower the tension of 
consciousness of a finite province of meaning, the more of 
everyday life is bracketed in its epoche. 
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Prevalent form of spontaneity 
The cognitive style of a finite province of meaning is 
characterized by a prevalent form of meaningful spontaneity. 
Spontaneous lived experiences are those which are initiated 
by the individual (as opposed to those which are merely 
perceived by the individual). Spontaneous lived experiences 
are termed behavior. Some behavior is never reflected upon 
and is therefore non-meaningful (e.g., respirations, eye 
blinks, passing facial expressions, etc.). It is, however, 
the individual's meaningful behavior, called conduct, which 
affects the cognitive style of a finite province of meaning. 
Conduct is of several forms, some of which are more prevalent 
than others in a finite province of meaning. 
Covert conduct is meaningful behavior which occurs only 
within duration, or in the individual's inner life. Covert 
conduct is called thinking, although it is not necessarily 
intended (remembering one's own dog upon seeing someone 
else's is unintended thinking). Overt conduct is manifested 
in the outer world, in cosmic time. It is called doing, and 
may or may not be intended (yawning is usually unintended 
doing). 
Preconceived, planned conduct, either covert or overt, 
is called action. Some action (e.g., a day-dream) is not 
intended to be carried out; there is no intention to realize 
such action. Action which is intended to be carried out is 
called performance. A performance may be covert, as in 
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mentally solving a mathematical problem, or it may be overt, 
as in picking up a book. Performance which is overt is 
called working. "Working, then, is action in the outer 
world, based upon a project and characterized by the 
intention to bring about the projected state of affairs by 
bodily movements" (21:212). 
The various forms of meaningful spontaneity—covert and 
overt thinking, doing, action, and performance—characterize 
to different extents the cognitive style of each finite 
province of meaning. For example, in the world of everyday 
life, the dominant form of spontaneity is overt performance, 
or working. By contrast, the world of scientific 
contemplation is characterized by covert performance 
(specifically, the mental solving of theoretical problems) 
as the prevalent form of spontaneity. 
Form of experiencing one's self 
For the individual, each finite province of meaning 
features a specific form of self-experience. This form 
reflects both the epoche of the finite province of meaning 
and its prevalent form of spontaneity. In the world of 
everyday life, for example, the specific epoche is a 
complete acceptance of the realities of daily life. 
Correspondingly, self is experienced as subject to the 
realities of embodiment, mortality, the necessity of food 
and rest, etc. By contrast, in the epoche of the world of 
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daydreams, some or all of those realities may be suspended. 
Thus, self may be experienced as invisible, immortal, able 
to fly, superhuman in strength, etc. 
The prevalent form of spontaneity in the everyday world 
is that of working; thus, the working self is the dominant 
form of self-experience in the everyday world. In the world 
of scientific contemplation, however, thinking performance 
is the prevalent form of spontaneity. In that finite 
province of meaning, self is experienced primarily as a 
thinking self. 
Besides the general form of self-experience, a more 
definite self-role may characterize a finite province of 
meaning. The individual may identify self specifically with 
the particular role which is filled in spontaneous 
experiences within the finite province of meaning. In the 
everyday world, for example, self may be experienced not 
simply as a working self, but more precisely as a "mother" 
working self, a "law-enforcer" working self, etc. In the 
world of scientific contemplation, the thinking self may 
be a physicist, chemist, biologist, or mathematician 
thinking self. In the world of daydreams, self may be 
experienced as a medieval knight, a space explorer, a ghost, 
or a superhero. 
Form of sociality 
In addition to the form of self-experience, the form in 
which the individual experiences and interacts with others 
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(and whether such interaction even takes place) is a 
characteristic feature of each finite province of meaning. 
In the world of everyday life, the existence of other 
people is accepted as reality. Further, it is accepted 
that all people share the same principal means of 
interpersonal communication, and that such communication 
takes place under certain universally understood rules and 
conventions. Thus, language, music, movement, visual art, 
and other common forms of social communication are 
characteristic of the everyday world. In other finite 
provinces of meaning, however, this may not be the case. 
The play world of a child, for example, permits some 
sociality in the form of mutual participation and even 
social interaction, as when several children share the same 
sandbox activity. Non-players, however, are alien to the 
sandbox communications. In the world of insanity, the 
individual may find it impossible to communicate with others, 
or others may not be recognized at all. In the world of 
dreams, the individual is totally isolated, unable to share 
experiences with anyone. Thus, the extent of sociality in 
finite provinces of meaning ranges from the full, rich 
interpersonal communications of the everyday world to the 
total isolation of the world of dreams. The extent and the 
particular form of such sociality constitutes a definitive 
characteristic of the cognitive style of a finite province 
of meaning. 
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Time perspective 
The experiences of each finite province of meaning take 
place within a prevalent time frame or intersection of time 
frames. As explained in Chapter III, time frames, or 
perspectives of time, include the inner time of duration, 
biological time (the time of physiological events), and 
external cosmic time, which is quantified in daily life into 
standard or clock time. The working self, which characterizes 
the world of daily life, functions in the vivid present, 
where duration intersects with cosmic time. That 
intersection, then, is the prevalent time perspective of the 
world of daily life. By contrast, the time perspective of 
the world of dreams is exclusively that of duration, or 
inner time. 
Some finite provinces of meaning feature modification 
of the everyday time perspective. In the world of daydreams, 
experiences may occur in a prescribed period of standard 
time—for example, the time of World War II or the twenty-
first century. Further, time may be condensed or magnified, 
as when several weeks pass between acts in a stageplay. 
The temporal boundaries of some finite provinces of 
meaning differ from those of the everyday world. Experiences 
in the everyday world are limited to the lifetime of the 
individual. Thus, the individual's birth and death are the 
temporal boundaries of everyday experiences. In other 
finite provinces of meaning, however, these boundaries may 
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be restricted. Involved in the world of a joke, for example, 
the individual is nevertheless aware that the joke will last 
only a few minutes at most. Thus, the individual recognizes 
a much closer horizon of experience in the world of the joke 
than in the everyday world. 
A finite province of meaning is characterized both by 
the time frame in which lived experiences unfold and by the 
temporal boundaries of those experiences. In these respects, 
time perspective is a definitive feature of the cognitive 
style of each finite province of meaning. 
Space perspective 
In addition to a time perspective, each finite province 
of meaning features a particular space perspective. 
Although not specifically listed by Schutz as a 
characteristic of cognitive style, space perspective was 
identified and discussed in Schutz's descriptions of various 
finite provinces of meaning. 
Schutz (26) noted that space in the world of everyday 
life is centered around the individual. 
The place in which I find myself, my actual "here," 
is the starting point for my orientation in space. 
It is the zero-point of the system of coordinates 
within which the dimensions of orientation, the 
distances and perspectives of objects, become 
determined in the field that surrounds me. 
Relative to my animate organism, I classify the 
elements of my surroundings under the categories 
right, left, above, below, in front of, behind, 
near, far, etc. (26:36-37). 
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Given self as the spatial center of the individual's 
everyday world, Schutz (21) distinguished between two major 
zones, or strata, in the spatial arrangement of this finite 
province of meaning. These are the world within actual 
reach and the world within potential reach. 
The stratum of the everyday world which is accessible 
to the immediate experience of the individual is called the 
world within actual reach. It includes the portion of the 
world which can be perceived from the reference point of 
the individual. The world within actual reach is subject to 
change as this reference point, the location of the 
individual, changes in the everyday world. Thus, the world 
within actual reach is a function of the spatial and temporal 
location of the individual—the here and now. 
Beyond the world within actual reach of the individual 
is the world within potential reach. This stratum of the 
everyday world has two parts, the world within restorable 
reach and the world within attainable reach. The world 
within restorable reach refers to the individual's past, 
being the spatial location of experiences already lived 
through by the individual. This sector of the everyday 
world is potentially accessible by means of the individual 
returning from the present locus to the one from which this 
sector was previously within actual reach. The world 
within attainable reach refers to the individual's future, 
being the spatial location of anticipated experiences. This 
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sector of the everyday world is not, and has never been, 
within actual reach of the individual. It is, however, that 
sector of the world which the individual expects can be 
brought into actual reach (although the likelihood of such 
an eventuality may not be consistent with the individual's 
expectations). 
The world within actual reach and the world within 
potential reach are spatial concepts which apply to all 
finite provinces of meaning, characterizing the cognitive 
style of each. Schutz noted that these strata of reality 
in other finite provinces of meaning may differ drastically 
from those in the everyday world. In the world of daydreams, 
for example, the world within potential reach is limited 
only by the individual's imagination. In other finite 
provinces of meaning, however, the world within potential 
reach may be severely restricted. The world of a stageplay, 
for example, lies within the setting placed between the 
audience, the wings, and the curtains of the stage. 
In various finite provinces of meaning, the spatial 
standards of the everyday world may be altered or suspended 
in a number of ways. In the fantasy world of Don Quixote, 
Schutz (22) observed, the universe conforms spatially to the 
Aristotelian arrangement of regions encircling the earth 
and providing the natural habitats of earth, water, air, and 
fire. Further, for a knightly inhabitant of Don Quixote's 
world, distant locations can easily be brought within actual 
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reach because instantaneous, magical transportation over 
great distances is commonplace. In the child's play world, 
a toy truck may assume huge proportions for the child even 
while it is being held in the child's hand. In the world of 
art, a formidable mountain may fit easily onto a two-
dimensional scrap of canvas. Thus, the space perspective of 
each finite province of meaning constitutes a characteristic 
feature of its cognitive style. 
Pattern of causality 
Experiences are generated in characteristic ways within 
each finite province of meaning. The emphasis upon particular 
causal sources is a characteristic feature of the cognitive 
style of each finite province of meaning. In the world of 
everyday life, for example, the dominant form of spontaneity 
is the working performance of the individual. Intentional, 
planned actions directed toward meeting practical goals of 
the individual are the prevalent pattern of causality in 
this world. Other causal sources, such as the forces of 
nature (e.g., earthquakes, weather, growth, disease) and of 
physical science (e.g., gravity, electromagnetism, nuclear 
radiation) are secondary in importance to the practical 
projects of the individual in the working world. By 
contrast, in the world of insanity, the individual may feel 
unable to control the events of life, recognizing instead 
only the forces of chance or the will of perceived enemies. 
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In some finite provinces of meaning, causal forces 
which are not commonly recognized in the practical 
experiences of the everyday world may play major roles. In 
the world of religious experience, for example, the will of 
God dominates the efforts of mortals, prayer is a recognized 
causal force, and miracles attest to the supreme causal 
power of God. Another such finite province of meaning, 
discussed at length by Schutz (22), is the fantasy world of 
Don Quixote. Experiences in this world, he observed, are 
controlled by forces of enchantment, which supersede the 
inferior, spontaneous efforts of humans. Enchanters (e.g., 
magicians) in this world "can transform all things and 
change their natural shapes" (22:139). Further, Schutz 
stated, the activity of such beings "is the basic category 
of Don Quixote's interpretation of the world" (22:139). 
Thus, the pattern of causality in this world is clearly 
dominated by forces of enchantment. 
In each finite province of meaning, then, an ordered 
pattern of causal sources emerges. The individual's 
acceptance of the pattern of causality is a feature of the 
cognitive style associated with each finite province of 
meaning. 
Summary 
A finite province of meaning is a meaning context of a 
high order. Its constituent experiences share a common, 
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characteristic style of existence, called cognitive style. 
The elements of this cognitive style can be identified as 
features of the set of experiences. They include for each 
finite province of meaning the tension of consciousness, the 
epoche, the form of spontaneity, the form of experiencing 
one's self, the form of sociality, the time perspective, the 
space perspective, and the pattern of causality. 
With respect to the cognitive style which they display, 
the experiences in a finite province of meaning are mutually 
compatible. Since the cognitive style of each finite 
province of meaning is unique, the experiences in any one 
province are inconsistent and incompatible with those of any 
other province. Consequently, finite provinces of meaning 
are mutually exclusive. The transition from one province to 
another is accomplished by a cognitive leap. It is 
accompanied by a shock experience which corresponds to the 
change in cognitive style. 
The accent of reality is bestowed by the individual 
upon each finite province of meaning as a whole, and is 
dependent upon the consistency of cognitive style. Thus, 
reality for the individual is determined by the finite 
province of meaning in which experiences are being lived. 
In Chapter V, a definition of a sport will be offered. 
According to that definition, the constitution of sport 
experiences as finite provinces of meaning will be analyzed. 
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CHAPTER V 
SPORTS AS FINITE PROVINCES OF MEANING 
In Chapter IV, it was shown that, in order for a 
given set of the individual's experiences to constitute a 
finite province of meaning, the experiences must share a 
consistent cognitive style. All of the dream experiences 
of the individual, for example, display the same tension 
of consciousness, epoche, form of spontaneity, form of 
self-experience, form of sociality, time perspective, space 
perspective, and pattern of causality. Further, the 
cognitive style of the set of experiences must be unique. 
No two distinct finite provinces of meaning share the same 
cognitive style. (If they did, then one would reduce or 
translate to the other.) Thus, the cognitive style of the 
individual's dream experiences, for example, is unlike the 
cognitive style of the individual's lived experiences in 
any other finite province of meaning. 
The particular sets of experiences which are of 
interest in this study are those of the individual during 
participation in each of various sports. In order to 
conclude that the experiences of participating in each sport 
(e.g., tennis or basketball) constitute a finite province of 
meaning, it must be demonstrated that, in each sport, the 
individual's experiences share a unique cognitive style 
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(21:341). In the next section, a definition of a sport will 
be presented. It will then be argued that the set of the 
individual's participatory experiences in each sport displays 
a common, unique cognitive style and therefore constitutes a 
finite province of meaning for the individual. 
Definitional Factors and the Cognitive Style 
of Sport Experiences 
For the purpose of this study, a sport is defined as 
a human activity which involves specific 
administrative organization, a historical 
background of rules or customs which define 
the objective and limit the pattern of human 
behavior; it involves challenge and a definite 
outcome determined by physical skill (8:vii). 
Obvious examples of activities which qualify as sports 
by this definition include tennis, basketball, football, and 
gymnastics. The individual's participatory experiences in 
each of such sports, then, involve the factors designated in 
the definition (specified, of course, for each sport). In 
particular, five of the factors are (1) administrative 
organization, (2) objective of behavior, (3) pattern of 
behavior, (4) element of challenge, and (5) component of 
physical skill. It will be demonstrated that each of these 
factors helps to determine the cognitive style of the set 
of experiences. 
Administrative organization 
By the definition given, a sport includes specific 
administrative organization. Associated with each sport are 
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identifiable authorities which regulate the formal 
organization of events. In tennis, for example, the 
designation of amateurs and professionals, the matching of 
contestants by age group, the establishment of criteria for 
open and closed competitions, the selection and seeding of 
players, the qualification of officials, and other 
administrative duties are performed by such authorities as 
the International Lawn Tennis Federation, various tournament 
committees, and team coaches. 
The administrative organization specific to a sport 
partly determines the epoche which characterizes 
participatory experiences in the sport. Lines of authority 
in the everyday world, for instance, are replaced by the 
authority and decision-making privilege of the 
administrative organization for the sport. Correspondingly, 
the experiences of the participant in sport are marked by 
the suspension of everyday lines of responsibility and the 
acceptance of authority and responsibility dictated by the 
regulatory structure for the sport. 
The administrative organization of each sport 
designates criteria for individual participation such as age, 
sex, experience, win-loss record, geographical location, and 
amateur or professional status. In this capacity, the 
administrative organization has a direct influence on both 
the individual's form of self-experience and the form of 
sociality characteristic of participatory experiences. By 
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the criteria established, the individual experiences self 
not only as a player in the sport, but also, perhaps, as 
an amateur or professional player, local or international 
player, "weekend hacker" or top-ranked champion, home-team 
or visiting player. In addition, the individual is 
generally matched with teammates and opponents of similar 
caliber. The persons with whom participatory experiences 
are shared are commonly limited by the administrative 
organization to participants with comparable skill, 
background, amateur/professional status, age, sponsorship, 
etc. In this way, the administrative structure of a sport 
is a determining factor of the form of sociality as well as 
the form of self-experience in the cognitive style of the 
individual's participatory experiences. 
Objective of behavior 
According to the given definition of a sport, the 
rules and customs of each sport specify the objective of 
participatory behavior. In basketball, for example, the 
objective is to shoot the ball through the basket so as to 
score, with one's teammates, more points than do members of 
the opposing team. The example of basketball illustrates 
the effect of the stated objective on the cognitive style 
of participatory experiences. In order to meet the 
objective of the sport of basketball, the individual must 
act purposefully in the outer world. Thus, the prevalent 
form of spontaneity in basketball is that of working 
76 
performance. The objective also ensures that experiences 
take place in both personal and cosmic time, thus 
establishing the individual's general time perspective as 
that of the vivid present. Further, by requiring the 
propulsion of an object from the location of the individual 
to a more distant point within the world of actual reach, 
the objective dictates aspects of the individual's spatial 
perspective. Thus, the form of spontaneity, the time 
perspective, and the space perspective which characterize 
experiences in each sport are partly determined by the defined 
objective of the sport. 
Pattern of behavior 
The acceptable pattern of behavior is, by the 
definition given, delimited for each sport by the rules and 
customs of that sport. Rules and/or customs specify such 
aspects as space and time boundaries, acceptable and 
unacceptable movement patterns, appropriate treatment of 
opponents, and allowable use of external objects (e.g., 
balls, clubs, protective equipment). Such limits on the 
pattern of participatory behavior largely characterize the 
cognitive style of experiences in each sport setting. They 
specify the epoche, the form of self-experience, the form 
of sociality, the time and space perspectives, and the 
pattern of causality. 
The rules and customs of a sport identify aspects of 
everyday reality which are placed in suspension. In some 
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sports, for example (e.g., men's gymnastics, football), 
success is closely associated with sheer physical strength. 
In other sports (e.g., basketball, lacrosse), the importance 
of speed and agility in achieving success is an additional 
reality. Other determinants of success (e.g., socio­
economic status) which are a part of everyday reality are 
usually suspended in such settings. Thus, rules and 
customs are a determinant of the epoche of participatory 
experiences in each sport. 
Limitations on the pattern of behavior in a sport help 
to create the role or roles played by participants in the 
sport. Self is experienced by the participant in the form 
of baseball player or basketball player, for example. The 
rules, and especially the customs, of a sport further 
specify the form of self-experience. The baseball player is 
more specifically a pitcher, shortstop, etc., and the 
basketball player is a center, forward, or guard. Thus, 
the rules and customs of a sport help to determine for the 
individual the form of self-experience which characterizes 
the cognitive style of participatory experiences. 
The rules of each sport specify the number of teammates 
and opponents with whom experiences may be shared. They 
also limit the types of communication with others which are 
proper. In tennis, for example, there is no physical 
contact between opponents, and deliberate verbal attempts to 
distract an opponent result in the loss of points. By 
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contrast, in football both physical contact and verbal 
distractions are appropriate. In such ways, the limits on 
the pattern of behavior in each sport determine the forms of 
sociality which characterize the individual's participatory 
experiences in the sport. 
The requirement of physical skill guarantees that 
experiences in every sport take place in cosmic time as well 
as in inner time. The rules and customs of each sport, 
however, specify more precisely the standardization of 
cosmic time for participatory experiences in that sport. In 
women's lacrosse, for example, the exact period of 
participation (sixty minutes, divided into two equal halves) 
is specified. Participation ceases during this period only 
for official time-outs and for the half-time intermission. 
The rules of basketball, however, add that regulated time 
ceases whenever the ball leaves the playing area. In 
baseball, time is measured, not in minutes, but rather in 
innings of play. In tennis, participation is continuous 
until one individual or team has secured the necessary 
number and combination of points. In football, the 
periods of time for thinking performance (as in the huddle) 
are limited as well as those for working performance. Thus, 
the rules and customs of a sport limit the pattern of 
behavior in terms of time, and so specify the time perspective 
which characterizes the individual's set of participatory 
experiences in that sport. 
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The spatial perspective of participatory experiences is 
also determined by the rules of each sport. Internal as 
well as external boundaries are established. In basketball, 
the dimensions of the court are specified, and the entire 
area is within every participant's actual reach. In tennis, 
only one-half of the playing area can be occupied at any 
one time, but sides are exchanged at prescribed points during 
play. In football, the line of scrimmage and the external 
boundaries determine the world within actual reach of each 
participant; the world within potential reach fluctuates 
with the location of the ball and the role played by each 
participant (e.g., certain players are "ineligible" to be 
"down field"). Thus, by spatially limiting the pattern of 
behavior, the rules of each sport determine the space 
perspective of the individual's participatory experiences in 
the sport. 
Limitations on the pattern of behavior in each sport 
influence the relative potency of various causal sources of 
the participant's experiences. Although by definition the 
outcome of a sporting event is ultimately determined by the 
physical skill of human contestants, the relative importance 
of chance, natural forces (e.g., wind, heat), animal 
behavior, and human action vary from one sport to another. 
In tennis, for example, the luck-of-the-draw is recognized 
as a partial determinant of success in a tournament. In 
competitive sailing, wind and water conditions are 
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influential. In polo, the behavior of one's mount is a 
causal factor. Thus, the rules and customs which detail the 
procedures for each sport also establish the pattern of 
causality which characterizes participatory experiences. 
Element of challenge 
By the definition given, all sports include the element 
of challenge. Challenge is "difficulty in a job or 
undertaking that is stimulating to one engaged in it" 
(20:244). In a sport, the participant is stimulated by the 
challenge of the situation to outperform opponents. This 
places heavy demands upon the individual's attention to the 
requirements of the situation. Thus, the element of 
challenge dictates a high tension of consciousness for the 
participant in a sport. By so doing, it affects the 
cognitive style of participatory experiences. 
Component of physical skill 
By the given definition, the outcome of a sport contest 
is ultimately determined by physical skill. It was noted 
that this component establishes the prevalent forms of 
spontaneity and of causality as working performance, i.e., 
purposeful physical action in the outer world, directed 
toward the fulfilling of a prescribed goal. It was also 
pointed out that the component of physical skill ensures 
that sport experiences take place in outer, cosmic time 
as well as in inner, personal time. Although rules and 
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customs specify other aspects of spontaneity, causality, 
and time perspective for each sport, these general facts 
regarding cognitive style are determined directly by the 
requirement of physical skill. 
The component of physical skill also influences both 
the form of self-experience and the form of sociality in a 
sport. The individual's experiences of self as a 
basketball player or tennis player, for example, include 
the concept that such a self is physically skilled in 
particular patterns of working performance. The individual 
also experiences others, teammates and opponents, as 
similarly skilled. Forms of communication with others, 
then, are focused on making use of teammates' skills and on 
frustrating those of opponents. Thus, the component of 
physical skill in each sport helps to determine the cognitive 
style of the individual's participatory experiences. 
In summary, the given definition of a sport designates 
the five factors of administrative organization, objective 
of behavior, pattern of behavior, element of challenge, and 
component of physical skill. The unique specification of 
these factors for the individual's participatory experiences 
in each sport establishes the distinct cognitive style of 
those experiences. It is concluded that the individual's 
participatory experiences in each sport share a unique 
cognitive style and therefore constitute a distinct finite 
province of meaning. 
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The Cognitive Style of the Sport 
of Singles Tennis 
In order to exemplify the constitution of sport-
specific experiences as finite provinces of meaning, the 
cognitive style of the individual's experiences in the sport 
of singles tennis will be discussed. Each of the eight 
designated characteristics of cognitive style—tension of 
consciousness, epochs?, form of spontaneity, form of self-
experience, form of sociality, time perspective, space 
perspective, and pattern of causality--will be considered. 
Tension of Consciousness 
The element of challenge is, by definition, present in 
all sports. It was shown in the previous section that this 
element is responsible for the high tension of consciousness 
which characterizes the cognitive style of all sports. 
Singles tennis is no exception to this. The tennis player, 
stimulated by the difficulty of the objective at hand, is 
highly attentive to the demands of the situation in striving 
to outperform the opponent. Consequently, the player's 
tension of consciousness is high. 
Epoche 
The epoche which characterizes the cognitive style of 
experiences in tennis involves the suspension of several 
realities of everyday life. These realities include aspects 
of physical existence, the system of relevances, the ability 
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to fulfill anticipations, the prescription for success, and 
the nature of responsibilities. 
The world of everyday life is characterized by the 
fundamental anxiety, the underlying sense of one's own 
finitude and the inevitability of death. This reality, with 
the related reality of the need for periodic nourishment 
and rest, characterizes the cognitive style of the 
individual's experiences in the everyday world. In tennis, 
however, these realities of physical existence are 
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drastically altered. The fundamental anxiety regarding 
death is suspended; the prospect of death is not a concern 
within the province of tennis participation. In place of 
the finitude of life, however, is the finitude of the sport 
contest, the fact that each match has a definite, foreseeable 
end. Every participatory experience is lived in the face of 
this reality. Nourishment and rest, as well as the actual 
playing of points, are adjusted to the reality of the 
finitude of the contest. The player takes refreshment and 
paces play according to the demands of the situation over 
the duration of the match, and no further. Thus, the epoch£ 
of the sport of tennis includes the replacement of the 
reality of death with the reality of the finitude of the 
contest. This reality is a distinct feature of the cognitive 
style of tennis experiences. 
As noted above, the reality of death is of great concern 
to the individual in the everyday world; in tennis, it is not. 
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This is an example of the variation in the individual's 
system or pattern of relevances between the world of 
everyday life and the sport of tennis. Besides death, 
other aspects of experience take on different relevance in 
the province of tennis. For example, the acquisition of 
worldly goods is irrelevant in tennis, whereas the winning 
of points (according to the definition of winning put forth 
in the rules of tennis) is relevant. Financial security is 
not relevant; physical fitness and emotional fortitude are. 
Interpersonal relationships are not relevant; anticipation 
of the opponent's movements is relevant. Plans for the 
distant future are not relevant; strategy for the immediate 
future is. In general, then, factors which affect the 
outcome of the sport contest at hand are highly relevant in 
the province of tennis. Factors which are of practical 
importance in everyday life but are relatively 
inconsequential in the sport setting are minimally relevant, 
if at all. This unique system of relevances, dictated by 
the objective and the demands of tennis, is a prominent 
feature of the epoche which characterizes the cognitive 
style of tennis experiences. 
The extent to which the individual is able to fulfill 
anticipations is another aspect of reality in each finite 
province of meaning. In the province of tennis, the 
individual's freedom of discretion in determining the future 
is similar to that in the everyday world. In neither 
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province can future events be brought about completely at 
the discretion of the individual (as they can, for example, 
in the world of daydreams). Both in the everyday world and 
in tennis, however, the individual can often determine the 
likely outcome of events, and planned, purposive actions can 
help to bring about the future as it is desired and/or 
expected to be. 
Despite these similarities, there is a notable 
difference between the everyday world and the sport of 
tennis with regard to the individual's ability to fulfill 
anticipations. Plans and projects in tennis are generally 
focused on meeting the relatively narrow objective of the 
sport. Anticipations commonly refer to the expected 
movements of the opponent and to the outcomes of individual 
points and combinations of points. The tennis player's 
ability to fulfill such anticipations is largely a function 
of that player's skill in comparison to the opponent's skill. 
If the player's skill is superior to that of the opponent, 
then the player has greater control over future events than 
when the opponent's skill is equal or superior. Thus, 
anticipations in the sport of tennis are narrowly focused, 
and the individual's ability to fulfill such anticipations 
is largely determined by the relative skill of the two 
players. This reality in the sport of tennis characterizes 
the cognitive style of the individual's participatory 
experiences. 
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In the sport of tennis, factors which determine success 
take on a different reality than in the everyday world. 
Family background, wealth, formal academic education, and 
personal appearance, for example, are valuable in daily life 
but ineffective in obtaining the objective of a tennis match. 
Those realities of the everyday world, then, are suspended 
in the epoche of the province of tennis. Rather, success in 
tennis is determined by such factors as physical fitness, 
speed, and skill in the use of a racket and ball. This 
distinct formula for success in tennis uniquely 
characterizes its cognitive style. 
Another reality of the everyday world is the nature of 
responsibilities faced by the individual. Generally, such 
responsibilities involve family, friends, and various 
superiors and subordinates in the individual's life 
situation. Within the province of tennis experiences, 
however, the reality of those responsibilities is suspended. 
In tennis, the participant is responsible only to the rules, 
customs, and administrative organization which regulate the 
conduct of the sport. The epoche of the province of tennis, 
therefore, includes the suspension of everyday 
responsibilities in favor of those specific to the legitimate 
conduct of participatory experiences. 
Form of spontaneity 
The objective of the sport of tennis is to win the 
proper number and combination of points with the use of a 
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racket and ball in certain prescribed ways. The meeting of 
this objective is the ultimate purpose of the participant's 
spontaneous behavior. Since participation in tennis 
involves such' purposive, goal-oriented actions in the outer 
world, it can be concluded that the prominent form of 
spontaneity in the sport of tennis is that of working action. 
Although working action is the primary source of 
spontaneous experiences in tennis, other forms of meaningful 
spontaneity also give rise to participatory experiences. 
For example, the analysis and correction of problems 
encountered when one's service is repeatedly unsuccessful or 
one's volley consistently goes into the net requires mental 
problem-solving, or thinking performance. In addition, 
thinking takes place in tennis which is neither planned nor 
goal-directed. Such non-performance thinking may occur, for 
example, if the player is annoyed by the bright sun while 
tracking a lob, and momentarily reflects upon sunglasses 
which were left at home. Thus, thinking performance is an 
important, if not predominant, form of spontaneity in the 
province of tennis, and non-performance thinking is a common 
occurrence as well. 
Form of self-experience 
By definition, the outcome of a tennis contest is 
determined by physical skill. Further, the rules and 
customs of tennis dictate the specific skills and abilities 
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which are necessary to participate effectively in the sport. 
The participant's concept of self as tennis player, then, 
centers on attributes such as speed, conditioning, and 
specific skills which are associated with successful tennis 
performance. 
In addition to the general experience of self as a 
tennis player, the participant's concept of self involves 
those designations created by the administrative 
organization of the sport. For example, the participant may 
experience self as an amateur or professional, local or 
international, unseeded or top-ranked player. Thus, the form 
of self-experience which characterizes the individual's 
participatory experiences in the sport of tennis reflects 
the status of the individual within the overall structure of 
the sport as well as the goals and demands of each contest. 
Form of sociality 
In the everyday world, the individual encounters many 
others who display the same motivational and behavioral 
patterns. In addition, the others share with the individual 
the same principal means of communication. In the sport of 
tennis, however, only the opponent shares the individual's 
objective, patterns of behavior, and means of communication. 
Both players in tennis are bound by the rules, customs, 
and administrative organization of the sport. Both, then, 
are motivated by the same goal and use the same general 
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skills and actions in order to achieve the goal. In this 
sense, each is the other's peer, and there are no other 
peers in the contest. Although the identity of the 
individual's opponent may vary from one match to another, 
only one opponent is encountered in any particular tennis 
experience. 
The means of communication in tennis are highly 
restricted in comparison to those of the everyday world. 
No physical contact occurs between players, and normally 
few words are spoken. Music, visual art, and other common 
forms of communication in the everyday world are of no use 
in tennis. Physical location and bodily movements are the 
primary means of communication in the sport. By the 
receiver's location and stance, for example, the server 
knows that the receiver is ready and the ball can be put 
into play. In addition, each player may read the opponent's 
intentions by interpreting the opponent's movements 
preparatory to executing a shot. A player may even disguise 
or fake movements in order to cause the other to misjudge 
what action will follow. These communicating movements, 
however, primarily involve tennis skills and thus are unique 
to the sport of tennis. In this way, the specific 
communications, as well as the forms of communication, in 
tennis differ considerably from those of the everyday world. 
Although the opponent is the individual's only peer in 
the province of tennis, other persons occasionally perform 
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peripheral roles in the pattern of sociality. Umpires, line 
officials, coaches, and other administrators may regulate 
the conduct of a match. In this case, some verbal and/or 
nonverbal communication may take place between a player and 
such an administrator during the course of the contest. 
The form of sociality in tennis varies somewhat with the 
presence or absence of such additional, peripheral 
participants. 
Time perspective 
The objective of tennis experiences, as well as the 
required element of physical skill, establishes the primary 
time perspective as that of the vivid present. This flow of 
experiences in the intersection of inner time and cosmic 
time occurs as the individual both thinks and overtly acts 
with the purpose of meeting the objective of the sport. 
Although some participatory experiences occur in inner time 
alone (as when the player plans a strategy for the next 
service return), the vivid present is by far the predominant 
time perspective in tennis. 
The time perspective described above is similar to that 
of the everyday world. In addition, there is no distortion 
of standard units of time in tennis. Experiences in the 
province of tennis occur in units of time which are 
consistent with those in the everyday world. There is no 
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such thing, for example, as superhuman speed (as in the 
world of daydreams) or juxtaposition of distant periods (as 
in the world of a stageplay). 
Although these aspects of time perspective are 
consistent in tennis with those in the everyday world, 
other aspects of time perspective differ in tennis. The 
boundaries of time, for example, are different. Experiences 
in the everyday world are temporally bounded by the events 
of the individual's birth and death. In tennis, however, 
these temporal boundaries are considerably restricted. A 
contest commences with the first service and ends when the 
objective has been met or the match is interrupted by 
experiences which cast the players back into the everyday 
world (as when it rains or a player is incapacitated). The 
individual, then, is aware of a different, closer horizon 
of time in tennis than in the everyday world. 
In addition to the unique temporal boundaries of tennis 
experiences, the passage of time in tennis is marked by 
different events than in the everyday world. The progress 
of a tennis match is measured in points, games, and sets 
rather than in seconds, minutes, and hours. Although 
standard time may be superimposed upon a tennis contest, the 
course of the match from the perspective of the player is 
determined by the extent to which the objective of the match 
has been met. Further, the match is ended by the meeting of 
the objective and not by the marking of a prescribed number 
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of standard time units." In this way, the time perspective 
of the cognitive style of tennis experiences is unique. 
Space perspective 
As in the everyday world, self is the spatial reference 
point in the province of tennis experiences. Further, space 
is perceived as three-dimensional, and there is no distortion 
of space by which sizes or distances would be perceived as 
inordinately larger or smaller than in the everyday world. 
These aspects of space perspective in tennis, then, are 
consistent with those in the everyday world. 
In some ways, the space perspective of the province of 
tennis differs from that of the everyday world. The 
spatial boundaries of tennis experiences, for example, are 
unique. As prescribed by the rules of tennis, the ball must 
be kept in play within the baseline and sidelines of the 
court. In order to meet the objective of the sport, the 
player is spatially restricted to the area within a few 
yards beyond each boundary line. In addition, the net forms 
a boundary which restricts the player's area of actual 
physical reach to only half of the total area at a time. 
When serving, the player is further restricted physically to 
the area behind the baseline between the center mark and the 
prescribed sideline for each point. 
Despite these physical restrictions, the tennis player 
is always able to perceive the entire area in which 
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participatory experiences may occur during the match. 
Further, the area which is beyond actual physical reach at 
a given time can be intruded upon indirectly by sending the 
ball to any point in that area. Indeed, the spatial focus 
of the player's attention usually consists of locations 
which are beyond the player's actual physical reach. Thus, 
the cognitive style of the tennis player's experiences 
includes a space perspective which is unique to the province 
of tennis. 
Pattern of causality 
The sources of causality in the province of tennis are 
similar to those which are recognized in the everyday world. 
Purposive, working actions of the player and the opponent 
are predominant causal forces in tennis. The opponent, in 
fact, is a very powerful causal source, generally as 
influential in generating experiences as is the self. 
Because of the absence of other peers in tennis, however, 
causality originating with persons other than the opponent 
is not a factor. 
In addition to the two players, other sources of 
causality in tennis include change and such related factors 
as the court surface, the wind, and the sun. The luck-of-
the-draw may match the player with a more highly skilled, 
top-seeded opponent, thus affecting the probable outcome of 
a contest. The court surface may cause an occasional bad 
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bounce, an unpredictable breeze may carry an otherwise good 
shot out-of-bounds, and the sun may suddenly peek from behind 
clouds and unsight a player. Factors such as these, although 
recognized as influential on occasion, are of only minor 
importance compared to the players themselves as causal 
sources. Thus, the pattern of causality which characterizes 
the cognitive style of tennis experiences is dominated by 
the actions of the player and the opponent, with only minor 
influences in addition to those. 
Summary 
A set of the individual's experiences, all of which 
share a unique cognitive style, constitutes a finite 
province of meaning for the individual. According to the 
definition of sport given in this chapter, each sport 
includes specified factors which determine for that sport 
the unique cognitive style of the individual's participatory 
e x p e r i e n c e s .  I t  i s  c o n c l u d e d  t h a t  t h e  s e t  o f  t h e  i n d i v i d u a l ' s  
participatory experiences in each sport constitutes a 
distinct finite province of meaning for the individual. As 
an illustration, the cognitive style of the individual's 
experiences in the sport of tennis was discussed. 
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CHAPTER VI 
IMPLICATIONS AND CONCLUSIONS 
Implications 
The following points have been established in the 
preceding chapters: 
1. According to Alfred Schutz's theoretical framework, 
a lived experience occurs as a primal impression in the 
stream of consciousness, within the individual's inner time 
frame. As such, it is non-meaningful. When the experience 
is lifted from the stream of consciousness and constituted 
as a discrete object of attention, then it is meaningful 
to the individual. Specifically, the meaning of the 
experience for the individual lies in the individual's 
reflective attitude, or conscious stance, toward the 
experience. 
2. The individual's reflective attitude is a function 
of the point of view of the present moment, or here-and-now, 
at which reflection takes place. Therefore, the reflective 
attitude, and hence the meaning of the experience for the 
individual, is subject to change from one reflective moment 
to another. 
3. An experience may be reflected upon singularly, 
with its own meaning for the individual at the moment of 
reflection. Alternatively, the experience may be reflected 
upon together with related experiences. The related set of 
experiences, or configuration of meaning, then takes on for 
the individual a collective meaning. 
4. A finite province of meaning is a set of meaning-
compatible experiences. As such, it constitutes a 
configuration of meaning. Further, a finite province of 
meaning features a unique, consistent cognitive style. 
5. The set of the individual's participatory 
experiences in any sport (as defined in this study) 
constitutes a finite province of meaning. Such a set of 
experiences, then, composes a configuration of meaning with 
a unique, consistent cognitive style. 
Given these points, some implications can now be drawn 
regarding the individual's participation in a particular 
sport, and the effect of that participation on the meanings 
of participatory experiences for the individual. 
The meaning of an experience for the individual, i.e., 
the individual's reflective attitude in attending to the 
experience, is dependent on the point of view of the here-
and-now at which reflection takes place. According to 
Schutz, "it is from the point of view of the present moment 
that the shaft of attention is directed backward. . ." (24:73) 
This point of view of the moment of reflection includes 
such factors as the temporal distance of the present moment 
from the experience being reflected upon (24:74). (The 
greater this temporal distance, it was shown, the more 
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reconstruction of the experience is necessary in order to 
reflect upon it.) The central aspect of the point of view, 
however, is cognitive style — the individual's conscious 
stance toward lived experiences in general at the moment of 
reflection. Schutz stated, "the attitude of the Ego toward 
life . . . determines in turn its attitude toward the past" 
(24:73). Thus, the cognitive style of the individual's 
experiences at the moment of reflection determines the 
meaning for the individual of the experience (or set of 
experiences) which is the object of reflection. 
Schutz specifically mentioned the effect of the 
individual's tension of consciousness on the meaning of 
experiences (24:73). The other aspects of cognitive style 
which have been discussed also help to determine the meaning 
of experiences at the moment of reflection. The epoche, 
form of spontaneity, form of self-experience, form of 
sociality, time perspective, space perspective, and pattern 
of causality all contribute to the point of view of the here-
and-now. By so doing, they contribute to the reflective 
attitude and thus to the meaning of any experience which is 
the object of attention at the moment of reflection. 
The cognitive style of the individual's experiences at 
the moment of reflection determines the meaning of any 
experience which is the object of reflection. If the 
cognitive style of any two reflective moments is the same, 
then the meanings of the experiences reflected upon at 
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those two moments will have much in common. In this way, 
consistency in cognitive style from one moment to another 
results in a large degree of consistency in the meanings 
of experiences which are reflected upon. 
Such a consistency of cognitive style is found within 
a finite province of meaning. Every finite province of 
meaning features a cognitive style which not only is 
consistent from one experience to another, but also is 
unique to that province. Consequently, every act of 
reflection within a given finite province of meaning 
(i.e., which is itself an experience in the finite province 
of meaning) results in a meaning which is similar to every 
other meaning realized within that province. Further, 
those meanings are different in a fundamental way from the 
meanings which arise from reflective moments in any other 
finite province of meaning. 
The individual frequently experiences life in a 
particular finite province of meaning (e.g., by attending 
a stageplay or by playing tennis). By so doing, the 
individual assumes the particular cognitive style which 
characterizes experiences in that finite province of 
meaning. Any acts of reflection within that province, then, 
occur at moments whose points of view have the corresponding 
cognitive style in common. The meanings which result from 
such acts of reflection also have that cognitive style in 
common. In addition, that aspect of the meanings is 
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different from meanings which arise within any other finite 
province of meaning. 
Thus, the individual's experience of life in a 
particular finite province of meaning has a direct effect 
on the meanings of experiences which are reflected upon 
within the finite province of meaning. Notably, the 
participatory experiences themselves (i.e., those which 
compose the finite province of meaning) are meaningful in a 
consistent and distinct way when reflected upon during 
participation. As the individual plays tennis, participatory 
experiences become the objects of reflection in the course 
of play. For instance, the player frequently reflects upon 
both previous points and subsequent, anticipated points in 
order to plan a successful strategy. The meanings of such 
participatory experiences when reflected upon during play 
are largely determined by the cognitive style of the 
province of tennis. Thus, reflective acts during play 
result in meanings which have a distinct cognitive style in 
common. To this extent, the meanings of participatory 
experiences are predetermined as the individual enters into 
participation. 
When sport experiences are reflected upon during the 
individual's participation in other finite provinces of 
meaning, the resultant meanings include the cognitive style 
of those other finite provinces of meaning. In the province 
of everyday life, for example, memories of sport experiences 
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are meaningful from the perspective of the cognitive style 
of everyday life. The meanings of sport experiences which 
arise from reflections in daily life have the cognitive 
style of daily life in common. In addition, they are 
distinct in that respect from meanings which arise during 
sport participation or in any other finite province of 
meaning. Thus, sport experiences have fundamentally different 
meanings when reflected upon in different finite provinces of 
meaning. 
Conclusions 
Answers to the questions addressed in this study can now 
be stated. First, the set of the individual's experiences 
in each sport does constitute a finite province of meaning. 
The individual's tennis experiences, for example, share a 
unique cognitive style; they are a finite province of 
meaning for the individual. 
Second, the cognitive style of the individual's 
experiences at any moment of reflection is a component of 
the reflective attitude and therefore determines the meaning 
of the object of attention. Reflective acts within any 
finite province of meaning have the cognitive style of the 
province in common. The resultant meanings (which are the 
individual's reflective attitudes) have that aspect in 
common as well. 
Finally, this is true in the various sport provinces 
as well as in other finite provinces of meaning. In 
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particular, as the individual participates in a sport, 
events of that participation are frequently reflected upon 
as the contest progresses. The meanings which arise from 
such acts of reflection have the cognitive style of the 
sport in common. That aspect of the meanings, then, is 
predetermined as the individual enters into participation 
in any sport. Further, the meanings of sport experiences 
vary from one finite province of meaning to another. Sport 
experiences have different meanings when reflected upon 
during daily life, for example, than when attended to during 
sport participation. 
The purpose of this study was to initiate an inquiry 
into the meaning of sport experiences, based on an established 
theoretical foundation. The study is only a beginning; 
certainly Schutz1s theory can be expanded more fully and 
applied in greater detail. In addition, studies are needed 
which approach the topic of experiential meaning from other 
theoretical bases. Only then can the ultimate contribution 
of this study be assessed and a truly comprehensive 
understanding of experiential meaning in sport be reached. 
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